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 1 
Abstract 
 
This thesis is an interdisciplinary study on the role of National Human Rights 
Institutions (NHRIs) in the implementation of the primary responsibility of 
States to prevent mass atrocities (MA) under pillar one of the Responsibility 
to Protect (R2P). It focuses on current international law (IL) to delimit the 
scope of the prevention obligations of States and assesses the relevant 
preventive measures to States’ primary obligations under R2P. It then 
analyzes the role that NHRIs can play in their practical implementation. This 
thesis assesses the means and tools of the Colombian NHRI, the Defensoría 
del Pueblo (DP), in the prevention of MAs. In light of these findings, this 
dissertation outlines the prospects and challenges facing NHRIs in relation to 
the prevention of MAs.  
 
De lege lata that current IL only requires States to prevent genocide and war 
crimes. The author argues de lege ferenda that to the extent that crimes 
against humanity rise to the level of jus cogens and thus carry erga omnes 
obligations, States could have a positive obligation to act to prevent their 
commission. As to the preventive tools, structural and direct preventive 
measures are relevant to the implementation of State’s primary responsibility 
to prevent MAs. Even if NHRIs do not directly implement the obligations of 
States, they play an important practical role in monitoring the government’s 
implementation of IL, including its MA prevention obligations. NHRIs can 
support the operalization of preventive measures through their functions to 
promote a legal framework, to contribute to the implementation of the legal 
framework and through their control mechanisms. In the case of Colombia, 
the DP uses its mandate to promote and protect human rights to prevent the 
structural preconditions of MAs. The DP also prevents MAs more directly by 
flagging imminent risks and making recommendations to the authorities 
capable of taking the required action.  
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Responsibility to Protect, National Human Rights Institutions, 
Colombia, Defensoría del Pueblo, international law, international 
humanitarian law, international criminal law, international human rights 
law, genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, prevention, early-
warning, interdisciplinary.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
1.1.1 R2P Background 
 
Throughout the 20th and early 21st centuries, States for the most part 
stood by time and again while civilians were targeted by their governments, 
despite their declarations following World War II that such crimes must 
“never again” be allowed to happen. Emerging from a 2001 report by the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)1 - a 
Canadian-sponsored initiative established in 2000 - the Responsibility to 
Protect (R2P) represented the policy representation of the statement “never 
again” and aimed to halt mass atrocities (MAs) as imminent threats occurred. 
In the ICISS report, R2P redefined and extended sovereignty to include the 
primary responsibility of each State to protect its own people from MA 
crimes, and the collective responsibility of the wider international community 
to take whatever action is necessary to halt or avert such crimes in cases 
where a State would be unable or unwilling to protect its civilians.  
The Heads of States and Governments at the United Nations (UN) 
General Assembly unanimously adopted the R2P principle at the 2005 World 
Summit in its resolution 60/1.2  In paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World 
Summit Outcome Document (WSOD) the States agreed that the primary 
responsibility, to protect its own people from genocide, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and ethnic cleansing, lies within the State itself. This 
responsibility entails the prevention of MA crimes, ‘including their 
incitement, through appropriate and necessary means.’3 States also agreed 
that the international community should ‘encourage and help States to 
exercise this responsibility and support the UN in establishing an early-
warning capability.’4 They further agreed that in the case where a State is 
manifestly failing to protect its population from such crimes, the wider 
international community then has a collective ‘responsibility to use 
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means’, and should 
that be inadequate, ‘to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, 
through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including 
                                                
1 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, ‘The Responsibility to 
Protect’ (2001). 
2 UNGA Res 60/1 ‘World Summit Outcome Document’ (24 October 2005) UN Doc 
A/RES/60/1.  
3 ibid §138.  
4 ibid. 
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Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant 
regional organizations as appropriate’, in accordance with international law 
(IL).5 
In its 2009 report on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (2009 
UNSG R2P report), the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon outlined a three-
pillar strategy stemming from the agreed R2P principle.6 This strategy 
stresses the value of prevention and, when it fails, of early and flexible 
response tailored to the specific circumstances of each case. The three-pillar 
approach consists of (1) the protection responsibilities of each State, (2) 
international assistance and capacity building, and (3) timely and decisive 
international response. Moreover, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon stressed in 
the report that renegotiating paragraphs 138 and 139 of the WSOD would be 
counterproductive and that the next step should be for member States and the 
UN to operationalize R2P.7  
The idea that prevention is better than cure when it comes to MAs is 
widely accepted. In fact, the ICISS report had asserted prevention as the 
single most important dimension of R2P.8 Moreover, the international 
political comfort level is greater with regards to prevention than it is with 
regards to other more forceful components, such as humanitarian 
intervention. In Bellamy’s words, “[p]reventing atrocities saves lives, is less 
expensive than reaction and rebuilding, and raises fewer difficult questions 
about state sovereignty and non-interference.”9 
 
1.1.2 The interplay between R2P and NHRIs 
 
Taking into consideration the immediate need to translate the R2P 
principle into policy and the overwhelming importance of the prevention 
aspect of R2P, this thesis addresses the role, means and tools of National 
Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) in the implementation of the prevention 
aspect of pillar one, the protection responsibilities of States.  
This thesis investigates how NHRIs could use their mandate to protect 
and promote human rights and thereby make an important contribution to the 
implementation of R2P. In particular, it evaluates the ways in which NHRIs 
can make use of their mandate to prevent the occurrence, escalation and 
recurrence of MAs. This includes the monitoring of human rights before, 
during and after MA situations, for instance through an early-warning system. 
With the information NHRIs collect, they can advise governments on how to 
go about fulfilling their responsibilities in the matter of MA prevention. 
                                                
5 ibid para 139. 
6 Report of the Secretary General, ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ (2009) UN 
Doc A/63/677. 
7  ibid 28. 
8 ICISS report (n 1). 
9 Alex J. Bellamy, ‘Mass Atrocities and Armed Conflict: Links, Distinctions, and 
Implications for the Responsibility to Prevent’ (Policy and Analysis Brief, The Stanley 
Foundation 2011) 1. 
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In the 2009 UNSG report, Ban Ki-moon points to the significant 
potential of NHRIs in this field when he mentions that strengthening the 
Colombian Defensoría del Pueblo (DP), has helped to address child 
recruitment and demobilization, gender-based violence in conflict and sexual 
exploitation related to the conflict.10 The Colombian DP is a highly 
interesting NHRI to study with regards to the prevention of MAs as it 
established the most sophisticated early-warning system11 where the risk 
reports are submitted to an Early-Warning Committee chaired by Colombia’s 
Vice-President. Systems like these can play a significant role in the effective 
implementation of R2P. The thesis will more specifically analyze the ways in 
which the DP uses its mandate to prevent MAs. 
 
1.1.3 Objective of the study 
 
The objective of this thesis is threefold:  first, to analyse the scope of 
the prevention obligations of States under the first pillar of R2P; second, to 
assess the role that NHRIs can play in the implementation of that aspect of 
R2P; and third, to evaluate how the Colombian DP in particular can use its 
mandate to prevent MAs.  
The research is partly carried out in the field. Through the insights of 
local staff working with the DP in the prevention of MAs in Colombia, this 
study assesses opportunities and challenges of the DP in the implementation 
of Colombia’s prevention responsibilities under the first pillar of R2P. 
Following this assessment, the author presents recommendations to enhance 
the capability of NHRIs in general and the DP in particular to prevent MA 
crimes.  
This study is ultimately aimed at contributing to translating the R2P 
pillar one’s promise into practice. 
 
1.1.4 Research questions 
 
The following three research questions will be answered in the subsequent 
chapters:  
1. What is the scope of the obligations of member States to prevent MAs 
under pillar one of R2P? 
2. What is the role of NHRIs in the prevention of MAs and thereby the 
implementation of the first pillar of R2P? 
                                                
10  Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (n 6) para 25. 
11 Thomas Pegram, ‘Fulfilling the Responsibility to Protect: Strengthening National and 
Collective Capacities to Prevent and Halt Mass Atrocities – The Role of National Human 
Rights Institutions, (First Meeting of National Focal Points, Jointly convened by the Foreign 
Ministries of Costa Rica, Denmark and Ghana, in association with the Global Centre for the 
Responsibility to Protect, 17 May 2011) <http://tompegram.com/wp-
content/uploads/2011/05/GCR2P_UN_Talk_Pegram.pdf > accessed 21 May 2012. 
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3. Through which means and tools stemming from its mandate can the 
Colombian DP contribute to the prevention of MA crimes in 
Colombia and thereby contribute to the implementation of R2P?  
 
 
1.1.5 Limitations 
 
This thesis will only address the responsibility of States to prevent 
MA crimes under the first pillar of R2P. Given that many response measures 
also contribute to the prevention of MA crimes, they will thus be addressed 
under that angle. This thesis will not address pillars two and three: the 
responsibility of the international community to assist States in fulfilling this 
responsibility to respond to MAs in the case where a State manifestly fails to 
protect its population. Peace-building and transitional justice issues and 
mechanisms will not be addressed other than for their preventive aspects 
within the field of the work of NHRIs.  
This research will assess the DP implementation of Colombia’s 
prevention responsibilities under pillar one of R2P. To achieve this, a 
thorough examination of the domestic instruments establishing the DP and 
delimiting its mandate is in order. Apart from this exception, the analysis will 
be limited to Colombia’s relevant international obligations. 
In this thesis, the scope of the prevention responsibilities of States 
under pillar one of R2P will be delimited using IL instruments, including 
relevant International Human Rights Law (IHRL) and Humanitarian Law 
(IHL) treaties. As such, the means, tools and role of NHRIs in the 
enforcement of IHRL and IHL principles will then be outlined. The issue of 
whether IHL is applicable given the different phases of the Colombian armed 
conflict is however beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
1.1.6 Methodology 
 
The three research questions will be answered following an applied 
methodology, which generally serves the professional needs of practitioners 
and policy makers, as opposed to pure research that is undertaken for a 
predominantly academic constituency.12 Whereas the first question will be 
answered through an applied doctrinal methodology, the two others will be 
answered using a qualitative empirical legal methodology. 
The first question delimiting the scope of prevention under pillar one 
of R2P will be answered relying on an applied doctrinal methodology, as 
                                                
12 Paul Chynoweth, ‘Chapter 3 – Legal Research’ in Ruddock & Knight (eds), Advanced 
Research Methods in the Built Environment (Wiley-Blackwell 2008) 29.  
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described in H.W. Arthurs’ legal research styles.13 This research style is most 
appropriate as this question relates to an expository research ‘in law’, namely 
the analysis of the R2P norm. The methods of doctrinal research are 
characterised by the study of legal texts for the discovery and development of 
legal doctrines. Such analysis usually makes reference to other external 
factors and seeks answers that are consistent with the existing body of rules.14 
In this case, the author relies upon international legal instruments as well as 
international jurisprudence to interpret those instruments. Since R2P is not in 
itself a legal norm, other documents leading to its formation, UN reports and 
political science research literature will also be used. This includes materials 
such as the ICISS report and doctrine on peace, conflict and security. The 
author relies on this combination of material by carrying out a systematic 
legal analysis. 
The two other research questions relating to the role of NHRIs in the 
prevention of MAs and the ways in which the DP uses its mandate to 
implement the prevention aspect of the first pillar of R2P will be answered 
through a qualitative empirical legal methodology.15 Looking at the 
implementation of R2P, these questions enquire into the meaning of the norm 
as a social entity. The social, political and legal processes involved can only 
be adequately understood through qualitative analysis. This interdisciplinary 
research method is most suited to answer such questions ‘about the law’.16  
For a better understanding of the structures and organizations of 
NHRIs and for increased effectiveness in answering the questions, the author 
is combining an analysis of documents and semi-structured individual 
interviews. The analysis of documents will provide evidence of policy 
directions, legislative intent and insights in perceived opportunities and 
practical challenges in the prevention of MAs.  
In order to answer Question Two and assess the role of NHRIs in the 
implementation of the prevention aspect of the first pillar of R2P, the author 
will rely on soft law instruments such as the Paris Principles and the first 
pillar of R2P (protection responsibilities of States) as well as political science 
research literature. The author will also make use of legal doctrine and UN 
documents on the subject.  
In answering Question Three and evaluate the means and tools of the 
DP in the implementation of Colombia’s responsibilities to prevent MAs, the 
author will first rely on reports of governmental and non-governmental 
organizations and political science research literature to describe and explain 
the context in which the DP is operating. This is necessary to fully 
comprehend the challenges that the DP faces in its implementation of R2P. 
The author will also rely on IL instruments outlining Colombia’s obligations 
                                                
13 H.W Arthurs, Law and Learning: Report to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research 
Council of Canada by the Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law, (Social 
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada 1983).   
14 Paul Chynoweth (n 12) 29-30.  
15 Lisa Webley, ‘Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research’ in P Cane & HM 
Kritzer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (Oxford, OUP 2010). 
16 H.W Arthurs (n 13). 
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in regards to MA prevention, the first pillar of R2P, legal doctrine as well as 
reports of organizations collaborating with the DP. 
Semi-structured individual interviews are most effective in helping to 
answer Question Three on the means and tools of the DP in the prevention of 
MAs17 by enabling researchers to “move beyond the written sources, and ask 
probing, theoretically-driven questions of key participants in the events and 
processes of interest.”18 The ‘process tracing’ method has been used to carry 
out the interviews. The goal of the process tracing method is to use the 
testimony of the most relevant actors to form a ‘theoretically-informed 
narrative’ of the process that is being researched.19 This method was most 
appropriate here as the goal of the field research was to obtain specific 
information about events and processes that include specific decision-making 
mechanisms involving a limited set of actors in the deliberations, decisions 
and actions. The researcher has interviewed the most important and 
influential actors who have the most direct involvement, and who play a 
critical role in the prevention of MA at the level of the DP, as well as 
organizations and institutions playing an important role in collaborating with 
the DP. 
In accordance with the aim of the process-tracing method a 
combination of both the positional and reputational sampling criteria to select 
the respondents for interviews was used to uncover as much information as 
possible on the means and tools of the DP in the prevention of MA.20 The 
initial group of respondents was identified according to a positional criteria, 
meaning that they have been identified based on their known relevance to the 
research topic. The initial sampling therefore included staff of the DP as well 
as other actors working in the prevention of MA in collaboration with the DP. 
The chain-referral sampling method (also known as snowball sampling) has 
then been used to ensure that unknown or unexpected actors, that have held 
positions that were initially not considered relevant or important, are included 
in the sample. This combined positional and reputational sampling criteria 
will avoid missing key subjects from the sample of interview respondents. In 
order to avoid the risk that the sample be biased towards one particular 
direction (given that respondents often suggest referrals that share similar 
characteristics or outlook), the researcher ensured that the initial group of 
respondents be sufficiently diverse.21 The author has interviewed one DP 
Early-Warning System (SAT) National Analyst, two former DP SAT 
Regional Analysts, one former Inter-Institutional Commission for Early-
Warning (CIAT) employee, two staff members of the DP Specialized Office 
on Comprehensive Attention to Victims, two staff members of the Office of 
the Attorney General,22 the Manager of the Swedish International 
                                                
17 See Annex 1 for the interview guide that was used. 
18 Oisin Tansey, ‘Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-probability 
Sampling’ [2007] 40(4) PS: Political Science and Politics, 14 
<http://www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/politics/papers/2006/tansey.pdf> accessed 21 May 2012. 
19 ibid 10-11.  
20 ibid 21.  
21 ibid 18-19.  
22 Procuraduría General de la Nacíon. 
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Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) Indevelop program and one 
Colombian sociologist.  
The results of the interviews have been used to inform the author of 
the means, tools and practical weaknesses of the DP in the prevention of 
MAs. The interviews responses have also been utilized to draw more general 
conclusions in relation to Question Two on the potential role NHRIs can play 
in the prevention of MAs. 
 
1.1.7 Structure of the study 
 
In chapter Two, the thesis identifies the scope of the legal prevention 
obligations of States under the first pillar of R2P. This is assessed through the 
evaluation of the relevant international legal instruments and jurisprudence.  
Once the legal scope of pillar one is assessed, chapter Three evaluates 
the relevant measures for its implementation. Chapter Three then goes on to 
assess the role that NHRIs can play in the implementation of these measures. 
This is addressed under three key elements: the promotion of an effective 
legal framework, the contribution to the implementation of legal frameworks 
and control mechanisms to support the legal framework and its 
implementation.  
Chapter Four assesses the MA prevention means and tools stemming 
from the mandate of the DP. The institutional challenges of the DP in that 
area are then identified on the basis of the findings of the field study. 
Chapter Five draws from the findings on the role of NHRIs in MA 
prevention and the case study of the DP and analyzes the prospects and 
challenges facing NHRIs in relation to the prevention of MAs. It further 
presents recommendations for a more comprehensive and effective 
contribution to the implementation of States prevention obligations to prevent 
MAs by NHRIs in general, and by the DP in particular. 
 
1.2 Scope of States primary prevention 
obligations under R2P 
 
In the 2009 UNSG report, Ban Ki-moon summarized the R2P 
principle and outlined a three-pillar implementation strategy, stressing the 
value of prevention. Pillar one concerns the responsibility of the State to 
protect its population through prevention and response to the four MA crimes. 
Pillar two relates to the duty of the international community to assist States in 
fulfilling their pillar one responsibilities. Pillar three addresses the 
responsibility of the international community, where a State is manifestly 
failing to protect its population, to take timely and decisive responses through 
‘appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means’, and should 
that be inadequate, ‘through the Security Council, in accordance with the 
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Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation 
with relevant regional organizations as appropriate’, in accordance with IL.23 
The present study is interested in the implementation of the prevention 
aspect of the first pillar: the responsibility of States to protect their own 
populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic 
cleansing. Prior to agreeing on R2P at the 2005 World Summit, States had 
legally committed themselves in some ways to preventing MAs. In chapter 2, 
these obligations will be analyzed to delimit the scope of the prevention 
obligations of States under pillar one. 
 
1.3 Role of NHRIs in the implementation of 
States primary responsibility to prevent 
 
R2P added an agenda for action to the pre-existing legal obligations of 
States to prevent certain grave violations of IL. This agenda will be discussed, 
before evaluating how NHRIs can contribute to its implementation.  
NHRIs are independent statutory bodies established by States with the 
mandate to promote and protect human rights. The means and tools available 
to a given NHRI for the promotion and protection of human rights depend on 
its mandate. They generally include the research, documentation, personnel 
training and public education in human rights issues. They can also involve 
the monitoring of human rights situations, audition of laws, submitting 
recommendations to the government, reporting to international bodies, 
holding inquiries and handling complaints.24 
NHRIs have an important role to play in monitoring States’ 
implementation of human rights. As it will be described below, their broad 
and conciliatory authority makes them well suited to promote and protect 
human rights. They thus play a crucial role in the practical implementation of 
human rights instruments at the national level. While States appoint the head 
of the institution, finance them, and make them accountable for their actions 
and spendings, NHRIs are to be independent from the State.25 In fact, it is 
their independence that determines their legitimacy and credibility and hence 
their effectiveness.26  
Experience shows that much of the information necessary for flagging 
imminent MAs is readily available. But experience also reveals that it is not 
sufficient to prevent MAs. The challenge is to systematically collect, analyze 
and transmit that information to those capable of acting. To provide 
                                                
23 World Summit Outcome Document (n 2) para 139. 
24 Inter alia, Principles relating to the Status of National Institutions (The Paris Principles), 
UNGA Res 48/134 (20 December 1993). 
25 ibid, Composition and guarantees of independence and pluralism. For a discussion on the 
difficulties of NHRIs with respect to their independence and accountability, see: Anne Smith, 
‘The Unique Position of National Human Rights Institutions: A Mixed Blessing?’[2006] 28 
Hum Rts Q 904.  
26 International Human Rights Policy and UNHCHR, ‘Assessing the Effectiveness of 
National Human Rights Institutions’ (2005) 20.
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information capable of effectively inciting preventive action, it is necessary to 
monitor trends, assess potential triggers and accelerators and understand the 
local context and culture.27  
It is argued, in this thesis, that NHRIs are in an ideal setting to do so. 
Given their investigative nature and in some cases, quasi-judicial powers, 
they are in a privileged position to collect and analyze information in its local 
context. NHRIs can then transfer this information to those capable of acting, 
including through early-warning assessments of conflict-related violence or 
policy recommendations for the government. In doing so, NHRIs contribute 
to the prevention of R2P crimes. A detailed analysis of the potential capacity 
of NHRIs in this regard will be provided in chapter Three. 
 
1.4 Case study of Colombia – Means and tools of 
the Defensoría del Pueblo in the implementation 
of R2P 
 
The Colombian DP constitutes a highly interesting example of the role 
that a NHRI can play in the prevention of MAs for many reasons. On the one 
hand, the DP is experienced with conflict-related violence as it is operating in 
the midst of the longest lasting internal armed conflict and humanitarian crisis 
in the Western Hemisphere.28 On the other hand, the DP is enabled to 
effectively participate in the prevention of such conflict-related violence: it is 
fully compliant with the Paris Principles; it holds exceptional functions in the 
promotion and defence of both human rights and humanitarian law; and it 
established the most developed NHRI early-warning system that monitors and 
flags imminent risks of human rights violations against civilian populations. 
Despite all of this, the occurrence of conflict-related MAs persists. This 
points to the challenges that remain in generating institutional preventive 
action.29 A detailed analysis of the opportunities and challenges of the DP in 
the prevention of MAs will be provided in chapter Four. 
                                                
27 IPI Blue Papers, ‘Conflict Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect’ (7, Task Forces on 
Strengthening Multilateral Security Capacity 2009) para 20.  
28 Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, ‘Indevelop - Evaluación de 
Término Medio del Proyecto Embajada de Suecia – Defensoría del Pueblo, Colombia Acción 
Regionalizada para la Protección y Restitución de Derechos’ (2011) 5.  
29 Pegram, ‘Fulfilling the Responsibility to Protect’ (n 11).  
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 2. SCOPE OF STATES PRIMARY 
PREVENTION OBLIGATIONS 
UNDER R2P 
 
The research on the prevention aspect of R2P is limited its agreed 
primacy importance. Bellamy argues that this is in part due to the 
disagreements about how wide the scope of prevention should be.30 Most 
scholars agree that R2P should not include all human security issues, but 
where should the line be drawn?  
R2P involves expectations about the responsibilities of States with 
regards to their population. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, prior to 
agreeing on R2P at the 2005 World Summit, States had legally committed 
themselves in some ways to preventing MAs. These commitments are rooted 
in international humanitarian and human rights law.31 Pillar one is therefore 
understood as a reaffirmation and codification of already existing legal 
norms.32  
In this chapter, the scope of the primary prevention obligations of 
States under pillar one will be assessed by: 1) considering the definition of the 
MA crimes found in international criminal law instruments; and 2) examining 
its relationship with the evolving IL on the prevention of international crimes, 
namely applicable IHRL and IHL obligations.  
 
2.1 R2P Prevention in the 2005 WSOD 
 
The scope of R2P as defined in the ICISS report was wider than the 
one agreed by member States at the 2005 World Summit. The former was 
building on the idea of human protection in situations where “a population is 
suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or 
State failure.”33 Its description of prevention covered the “root causes and 
direct causes of internal conflict and other manmade crisis putting 
populations at risk.”34 Root causes were described as including poverty, 
repression and failures of distributive justice.35   
                                                
30 Alex J. Bellamy, ‘Conflict Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect’ (2008) 14 Global 
Governance, 135-156. 
31 See section 2.3.1.  
32 Alex J. Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility to Protect – Five Years On’ (2010) 24(2) 143; Ethics 
& International Affairs, 24’ no. 2 (2010), pp. 143-169, 160; Edward C. Luck, ‘The United 
Nations and the Responsibility to Protect’ (2008) The Stanley Foundation Policy Analysis 
Brief, 4. 
33 ICISS report (n 1) xi. 
34 ibid ch 3.  
35 ibid 19-20. 
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At the World Summit, member States agreed to constrain the scope of 
the responsibility to protect their populations to four crimes: genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.36 In the 2009 UNSG 
R2P report Ban Ki-moon delineated the protection responsibilities of States - 
pillar one, to inculcate appropriate values, including respect for human rights 
and diversity, tolerance, inclusiveness and individual responsibility;37 to build 
institutions that facilitate protection, including the rule of law, rights-
respecting legislation, civil society capacities;38 and to consider the use of 
various learning devices and training capacities, including peer-review and 
NGO programmes.39 
Ban Ki-moon has stressed that distinctions need to be drawn about 
what R2P is and is not.40 In the words of Evans: “if R2P is to be about 
protecting everybody from everything, it will end up protecting nobody from 
anything.”41 In order for R2P to keep its political pull, capable of “generating 
an effective, consensual response to extreme, conscience-shocking cases,”42 it 
is important that it is not invoked improperly. The thesis will therefore take 
the four MA crimes as a point of departure for the following examination of 
existing obligations.  
 
2.2 Massive human rights violations 
 
There appears to be a preference for the idea that R2P should address 
only the direct and imminent causes or threats of genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity,43 and not other massive human rights 
violations. Secretary-General's Special Advisor, Edward Luck, argues that 
R2P is not suited to deal with systemic human rights problems, which are not 
characterized by large-scale violence.44 Bellamy explains that this position is 
based on the “understandable eagerness to defend RtoP's putative capacity to 
serve as a catalyst for timely and decisive international responses to MAs 
                                                
36 The parts of paragraph 138 of the WSOD (n 2) relevant to pillar one reads: “Each 
individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The responsibility entails the prevention of 
such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept 
that responsibility and will act in accordance with it.” 
37 Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (n 6) paras 13, 15, 16, 20, 21, 27. 
38 ibid paras 14, 17-19. 
39 ibid paras 22-26. 
40UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (Berlin Event on 
‘Responsible Sovereignty: International Cooperation For a Changed World’, Berlin, July 
2008) <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sgsm11701.doc.htm> accessed May 21 
2012. 
41 Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect (Brookings, 2008) 65.  
42 ibid. 
43 International Coalition for the RtoP, ‘Report on the General Assembly Debate’ (2009) 6-8; 
Gareth Evans, ‘The Responsibility to Protect in International Affairs’ (Australian catholic 
University, Melbourne, November 2009). 
44 Edward C. Luck, ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect at the United Nations’ 
(lecture to the University of Queensland, Australia, August 2009) 10-11. 
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against perceived attempts to broaden the principle to such an extent that it 
loses this mobilizing capacity.”45 Evans also argues in favour of a narrow 
definition of the scope of R2P based on a parallel reasoning.46 When it comes 
to the primary responsibility of States to prevent MA crimes however, the 
author argues that an approach addressing both the structural and direct 
causes of MAs is in order.47 
 
2.3 States legal obligations to prevent 
 
The ICISS described R2P as a guiding principle for States that builds 
on a range of legal obligations and political responsibilities.48 The negotiating 
history of the WSOD shows that these responsibilities were regarded as 
resting on existing IL.49 Most would accept that although many parts of R2P 
are grounded in IL, the principle, as agreed in the WSOD, as a whole does not 
constitute a legal norm.50 Pillar one alone is however understood as a 
reaffirmation and codification of already existing obligations,51 as States had 
legally committed themselves through IHL and IHRL to preventing MAs 
before agreeing to the R2P norm in 2005.  
The obligations of States to prevent MA crimes are most clearly 
developed in the enduring treaties relating to genocide and war crimes.52  
                                                
45 Alex J. Bellamy, Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect (Routledge, 2011) 93. 
See p. 67 for a discussion on how the case of regime-induced famine, military execution of 
civilians trying to flee the country, systematic use of torture and arbitrary killings as war 
crimes and crimes against humanity in North Korea was ignored. 
46 Evans (n 41) 69: “[i]t is very tempting to broaden R2P's application beyond the actual or 
feared commission of mass atrocity crimes: it is the case that issues of civilian protection 
(from loss of life, injury, economic loss, and assaults on human dignity) are always involved 
in any deadly conflict, whatever its cause and whatever its scale, and in any significant 
human rights violation. And of course, it is true that some full-fledged R2P mass-atrocity 
situations evolve out of less extreme human rights violations, or out of general conflict 
environments. But, again, to widen the focus too much is dangerous from the perspective of 
undermining R2P's utility as a rallying cry. If too much is bundled under the R2P banner, we 
run the risk of diluting its capacity to mobilize international consensus in the cases where it is 
really needed.” 
47 See section 3.1.2. 
48 ICISS report (n 1) xi.  
49 Ekkehard Strauss, ‘A Bird in the Hand is Worth Two in the Bush’ (2009) 1 Global 
Responsibility to Protect 291, 303. 
50 The legal status of R2P as a whole is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
51 See section 2.3.  
52 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (adopted by 9 
December 1948, entered into force 12 January 1951) 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (Genocide 
Convention); Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick 
in Armed Forces in the Field (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 
75 U.N.T.S. 31 (GC I); Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, 
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (adopted 12 August 1949, entered 
into force 21 October 1950) 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (GC II); Convention (III) relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War (adopted 12 August 1949, Geneva, entered into force 21 
October 1950) 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (GC III); Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of 
Civilian in Time of War (adopted 12 August 1949, Geneva, entered into force 21 October 
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Moreover, conventional and customary international law (CIL) have defined 
the elements of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.53 In 
addition, the Statutes of the International Criminal Court (ICC),54 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY),55 and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)56 as well as their 
jurisprudence have further developed the contours of international obligations 
relating to genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.57 
The provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court58 (Rome Statute) are for the most part seen as a codification of the legal 
understanding on the elements of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity.59 Ethnic cleansing does not in itself constitute an international 
crime. Instead, it is understood as falling under other forms of MA crimes.60 
In light of the relevant IL instruments and jurisprudence, this section 
will seek to determine the legal content of preventive obligations under the 
first pillar of R2P. Section 2.3.1 will define MA crimes.  Section 2.3.2 will 
then go on to examine the various obligations to prevent MAs found in IL.  
 
2.3.1 Legal definitions of MA crimes 
 
2.3.1.1 Genocide 
 
States have long had obligations with respect to genocide, which is 
defined in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide61 (Genocide Convention) as “any of the following acts 
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, 
                                                                                                                          
1950) 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (GC IV); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (AP I); Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 
December 1978) 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (AP II). See 2.3.2. 
53 See section 2.3.1. 
54 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 
2002) 2187 UNTS 90 (ICC Statute). 
55 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former 
Yugoslavia since 1991 (adopted by the Security Council 25 May 1993, S/RES/827 25) 
(ICTY Statute). 
56 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible 
for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in 
the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such 
violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 
December 1994 (adopted by S/RES/955 8 November 1994) (ICTR Statute). 
57 See section 2.3.2. 
58 ICC Statute (n 54).  
59 Luck (n 32) 4. 
60  See section 2.3.1. 4. 
61 Genocide Convention (n 52). 
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racial or religious group: 1) killing members of the group; 2) causing serious 
bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 3) deliberately inflicting on 
the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction 
in whole or in part; 4) imposing measures intended to prevent births within 
the group; and 5) forcibly transferring children of the group to another 
group”.62 The Genocide Convention requires State parties to prevent and 
punish genocide,63 as well as conspiracy, incitement, attempt to commit, and 
complicity in genocide.64 However these obligations are not limited to the 
parties to the Convention. In its Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 
1951, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) recognized that the provisions 
of the Convention express pre-existing CIL and obligations erga omnes, that 
is obligations owed toward all other member States of the international 
community.65 
The Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR both adopt the definition and 
description of punishable acts found the Genocide Convention.66 The Rome 
Statute also transposes the definition and description of punishable acts found 
in the Genocide Convention, with the exception of conspiracy.67  
 
2.3.1.2 War crimes 
 
Certain war crimes were codified under Article 6 of the Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT).68 The four Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 (Geneva Conventions)69 subsequently codified rules of 
IHL elaborating on the war crimes adjudicated at Nuremberg. All States have 
now ratified the Geneva Conventions. In any case, the provisions are also 
binding upon all States as CIL.70  
Article 8 of the Rome Statute more broadly defines war crimes, for the 
purposes of international criminal prosecution, as being “part of a plan or 
policy or as part of large-scale commission of such crimes.”71 This definition 
includes breaches of the Geneva Conventions72 and “other serious violations 
                                                
62 ibid article 2.  
63 ibid article 1.  
64 ibid article 3.  
65 Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention [1951] ICJ Rep, 23 et seq.  
66 ICTY Statute (n 55) para 4; ICTR Statute (n 56) para 2.  
67 ICC Statute (n 54) para 25.  
68 Charter of the International Military Tribunal (London Agreement of 8 August 1945) 
article 6. 
69 GC I, GC II, GC III, GC IV (n 52). 
70 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ, §§79, 
82.  
71 ICC Statute (n 54) article 8(1). 
72 ibid article 8(2)(a). These include wilful killing; torture or inhuman treatment; wilfully 
causing great suffering or serious injury; extensive destruction and appropriation of property; 
wilfully depriving prisoners of war or other protected persons of a fair trial and conscripting 
prisoners of war or children into military service; unlawful deportation, transfer or 
confinement; and taking of hostages.  
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of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict.”73 The 
Rome Statute also prohibits serious violations of Common Article 3 to the 
Geneva Conventions in cases of non-international armed conflict.74 Further, it 
expands on Common Article 3 prohibitions by adding the prohibition of 
“serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not 
of an international character, within the framework of IL” in non-
internationalized armed conflict.75 Most of the definitions provided in the 
Rome Statute are considered to be the codification of CIL.76 
 
2.3.1.3 Crimes against humanity 
 
Crimes against humanity were first defined in the Charter of the IMT 
as encompassing: “murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and 
other inhumane acts committed against civilian populations, before or during 
a war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of, 
or in connection with, any crime within the jurisdiction of the domestic law of 
the country where perpetrated.”77 
Crimes against humanity have since been expanded in the Statutes of 
the ICTY, ICTR, Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and ICC.78 The 
ICTY and ICTR Statutes add rape, torture and other inhumane acts to its 
                                                
73 ibid article 8(2)(b). These include intentionally directing attacks against civilians, civilian 
objects or humanitarian and peacekeeping objects; intentionally launching attacks despite 
knowledge of disproportionate loss of life or injury to civilians, civilian objects or the natural 
environment; attacking undefended non-military objectives; killing or wounding surrendered 
combatants; improper use of flags and insignias resulting in death or injury; transfer of a 
civilian population into or out of occupied territories; intentionally directing attacks against 
objects cultural or historic, and not military, significance; unjustified mutilation or scientific 
experimentation; declaring that no quarter will be given; unjustified destruction or seizure of 
enemy property; failure to recognize in a court of law the rights and actions of nationals of a 
hostile party; compelling nationals to take part in military actions against their own country; 
pillaging; the use of certain weapons, ammunitions and methods of warfare, including the use 
of poisonous gases; committing outrages upon personal dignity, including humiliating and 
degrading treatment; committing sexual violence such as rape, sexual slavery, or enforced 
prostitution, pregnancy or sterilization; using civilian shields; using starvation as a method of 
warfare.  
74 ibid article 8(2)(c). These include actions against any person not taking active part in 
hostilities, including surrendered, sick, wounded or detained prisoners, violence to life and 
person, in particular murder, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; outrages upon personal 
dignity; taking of hostages; and passing and execution of sentences without a judgment of a 
regularly constituted court with “all juridical guarantees which are generally recognized as 
indispensable.” 
75 ibid article 8(2)(e). These include, many, but not all, of the relevant elements listed in 
8(2)(b). Excluded are prohibitions on methods and means of warfare, such as those indicated 
in Article 8(2)(b)(xxvii)-(xx). 
76 Gerhard Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law, (TMC Asser Press 2005) 286; 
C.f. Kofi A. Annan, ‘Two Concepts of Sovereignty’ p. 122, who claims that the Statute also 
takes into account recent developments within the work of the ad hoc Tribunals. 
77 IMT Charter (n 68) article 6(c).   
78 ICC Statute (n 54) article 7; ICTY Statute (n 55) article 5; ICTR Statute (n 56) article 3; 
UN Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (adopted by Security Council A/RES/1315, 
14 August 2000) (SCSL Statute) article 2. 
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enumeration of categories of acts constituting crimes against humanity.79 The 
Rome Statute also adds the crimes of enforced disappearance of persons and 
apartheid80 as well as clarifying language to the crimes of extermination, 
enslavement, deportation, torture and forced pregnancy. 81 The acts must be 
committed “as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any 
civilian population.”82 The Rome Statute further requires “knowledge of the 
attack.”83 The ICTY held that a “widespread” crime may be established by 
the cumulative effect of a series of inhumane acts or the singular effect of an 
inhumane act of extraordinary magnitude.84 “Systematic,” on the other hand, 
consists of four elements: a political objective or ideology that drives the 
destruction, persecution or weakening of a community; perpetration of acts on 
a “very large scale” against a group of civilians, or the “repeated and 
continuous commission of inhumane acts linked to one another”; the 
preparation and use of “significant” public or private resources; and the 
implication of “high-level political and/or military authorities” in planning.85  
 
2.3.1.4 Ethnic cleansing 
 
The term ‘ethnic cleansing’ was coined in the early 1990s in response 
to deportation and forcible transfer of large numbers of civilians in the 
Balkans. In 1992, an expert group appointed by the UN Security Council 
defined ethnic cleansing as “rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by 
using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the 
area.”86  
Ethnic cleansing is currently not a crime in its own standing under IL. 
Acts of ethnic cleansing are however understood to fall within the scope of 
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity,87 such as: “genocide 
                                                
79 ICTY Statute (n 55) article 5; ICTR Statute (n 56) article 3. The residual “other inhuman 
acts” clause of crimes against humanity has been interpreted by the SCSL to include offenses 
such as forced marriages. (Prosecutor v Brima, Kamara & Kanu (Appeal Judgment) SCSL-
2004-16-A (2 February 2008). 
80 ICC Statute (n 54) article 7. 
81 ibid. The prohibited acts under the ICC Statute are murder; extermination; enslavement; 
deportation, forcible transfer or enforced disappearance; imprisonment or severe deprivation 
in violation of international law; torture; sexual crimes including rape, and enforced 
prostitution, pregnancy or sterilization; persecution where based on certain group identity in 
connection with any other crime against humanity; and apartheid. 
82 ICC Statute (n 54) article 7; ICTY Statute (n55) article 5; ICTR Statute (n56) article 3; 
SCSL Statute (n78) article 2. 
83 ICC Statute (n 54) article 7.  
84 Prosecutor v Blaskic (Trial Judgment) IT-95-14-T (3 March 2000) para 142. 
85 Prosecutor v Naletilic and Martinovic (Trial Judgment) IT-098-34-T (31 March 2003); 
Prosecutor v. Blaskic (n 84).   
86  UN Security Council, Commission of Experts, Interim Report of the Commission of 
Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), UN Doc S/35374 
(10 February 1993) para 55. The report also found that “policy and practices…[of] ethnic 
cleansing… constitute crimes against humanity and can be assimilated to specific war crimes. 
Furthermore, such acts also could fall within the meaning of the Genocide Convention.” ibid 
para 56. 
87  Evans (n 41) 12-13. 
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where ethnic cleansing entails an intent to destroy an ethnic group in part or 
in whole; crimes against humanity where there is systematic and widespread 
persecution based on ethnic identity in connection with any predicated 
element of crimes against humanity (in peacetime or war crime context); and 
war crimes where certain acts – such as forced deportation, sexual violence, 
and killing civilians are part of a plan or policy targeting an ethnic group in a 
wartime context.” 88  
Ethnic cleansing that meets the threshold of genocide is likely to be 
referred to as such. The term ethnic cleansing is however widely used also for 
crimes falling within the scope of crimes against humanity or war crimes.89 
Deportation and forcible transfer are the crimes most closely associated with 
ethnic cleansing.90 
 
2.3.2 MA prevention obligations  
 
2.3.2.1 Duty to protect under IHRL 
 
The 'duty to protect' is a concept of IHRL that mainly provides that 
States have a positive obligation in certain circumstances to prevent private 
actors from infringing on the rights of other individuals.91 In other words, in 
addition to ensuring that governmental actors refrain from committing 
violations, States must also take measures to prevent private individuals from 
committing human rights violations within their jurisdiction. The 'duty to 
protect' generally requires States to prevent, punish, investigate and redress 
human rights violations. While there is no such express provision in IL, it is 
widely accepted that States have this positive obligation in a wide range of 
areas under international human rights treaties.92 This obligation is based 
upon the idea that the protection of rights under international human rights 
instruments must be effective in practice, and not merely theoretical.93 This is 
also supported by the ‘Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a 
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International 
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian 
                                                
88 Tarun Chhabra and Jeremy B. Zucker, ‘Defining the Crimes’ in Jared Genser & Irwin 
Cotler (eds), The Responsibility to Protect – The Promise of Stopping Mass Atrocities in Our 
Time (Oxford University Press 2012) 42. 
89 ibid 54 
90 ibid. 
91 Thomas Buergenthal, ‘To Respect and to Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible 
Derogations’ in Louis Henkin (ed.) The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (Columbia University Press 1981), 72, 77-78. 
92 Sheri P. Rosenberg, ‘Responsibility to Protect: A Framework for Prevention’ 2009 1 
Global Responsibility to Protect, 442, 452. It is outside the scope of this thesis to analyze the 
range of positive obligations under IHRL. 
93 Golder v. United Kingdom (Judgment) App. 445/170 Eur Ct HR (21 February 1975). 
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Law’, adopted by the General Assembly in December 2005.94 This soft law 
instrument provides that the obligation to respect, ensure respect for and 
implement IHRL and IHL includes the duty to take appropriate measures to 
prevent violations and to investigate violations effectively, promptly, 
thoroughly and impartially and, where appropriate, take action against those 
allegedly responsible in accordance with domestic and international law. 
The 'duty to protect' has developed as a standard of due diligence 
requiring States to take reasonable active steps as could be expected from 
other States under similar circumstances.95 It is an obligation of conduct, 
rather than one of result. This means that if a State takes all reasonable 
measures to prevent a given human rights violation it will not be held 
accountable if the violation occurs. 
The part of R2P that requires States to take action to prevent genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing indirectly rests 
upon established norms of IHRL, including the 'duty to protect'.96 R2P thus 
presents an opportunity to improve the implementation of existing legal 
obligations relating to MAs, including the duty to protect as developed in 
IHRL.97 At the same time, the legal foundations of R2P, comprising of 
IHRL,98 can help support and specify the scope of States obligations to 
prevent under R2P.99   
                                                
94 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law (adopted and proclaimed by UNGA resolution 60/147 of 16 December 
2005) article 3.  
95 Rosenberg (n 92) 453-454. 
96  ibid 447. 
97 ibid 452-9; Strauss (n 49) 291. 
98 Most notably: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 
1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR); International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 
January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR); Genocide Convention (n 52); International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (adopted 21 December 
1965, entered into force 4 January 1969) 660 UNTS 195 (ICERD); Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (adopted 18 December 1979, 
entered into force 3 September 1981) UN Doc A/34/46 (CEDAW); Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (adopted 10 
December 1999, entered into force, 22 December 2000 (Optional Protocol to CEDAW); 
Convention on the Elimination of All Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (adopted 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 
June 1987) UN Doc A/39/51 (CAT); Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture 
and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (adopted 18 December 
2002, entered into force 22 June 2006) GA res A/RES/57/199 (OPCAT); Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) UN 
Doc A/44/49 (CRC); Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
involvement of children in armed conflict (adopted 25 May 2000, entered into force 12 
February 2002) UN Doc A/54/49 (Optional Protocol to CRC on children in armed conflict); 
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance 
(adopted 20 December 2006, entered into force 23 December 2010)  UN Doc A/RES/61/177 
(ICED). 
99 Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), [2007] ICJ 
Judgement, General List No. 91. At para. 429 re international instruments providing an 
obligation on the States parties to it to take certain steps to prevent the acts it seeks to 
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2.3.2.2 Duty to prevent genocide 
 
In its 2007 judgment on the implications of the Genocide Convention 
for States, Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro,100 the ICJ 
specified the obligations of States to prevent and punish genocide. The Court 
held that “if the State has available to it means likely to have a deterrent effect 
on those suspected of preparing genocide, or reasonably suspected of 
harbouring specific intent (dolus specialis), it is under a duty to make such 
use of these means as the circumstances permit.”101 The ICJ found that while 
one of the most effective ways to prevent criminal behaviour is to criminalize 
and punish it, the obligation to prevent is free standing.102 Its scope is beyond 
the duty to punish and to call on the competent UN organs to take action. The 
Court found that the States’ obligation to prevent entails positive obligations 
“to employ all measures reasonably available to them so as to prevent 
genocide as far as possible.”103 According to the ICJ, “the obligation in 
question is one of conduct and not one of result, in the sense that a State 
cannot be under an obligation to succeed, whatever the circumstances, in 
preventing the genocide.”104  Moreover, this duty to prevent begins at the time 
when the State knows, or should have known, that there was a serious risk of 
genocide occurring.105 
The ICJ stated that while a criminal act is committed by individuals 
and entails individual accountability, the failure of a State to fulfil its 
obligation to prevent and punish under IL constitutes a breach of an 
international obligation.106 On that ground, the ICJ used the standard of 'proof 
at a high-level of certainty' to decide if Serbia was responsible for failing in 
its obligation to prevent genocide.107 To do so, the Court considered if 
Serbian authorities had exercised ‘due diligence’ in respect to the massacre at 
Srebrenica, and determined that they had not.108  
                                                                                                                          
prohibit: “Many other instruments (other than the Genocide Convention) include a similar 
obligation, in various forms: see, for example, the Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 10 December 1984 (Art. 2); the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected 
Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, of 14 December 1973 (Art. 4); the Convention on the 
Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel of 9 December 1994 (Art. 11); the 
International Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings of 15 December 1997 
(Art. 15). The content of the duty to prevent varies from one instrument to another, according 
to the wording of the relevant provisions, and depending on the nature of the acts to be 
prevented.” 
100 ibid. 
101 ibid para 431.  
102 ibid para 427. 
103 ibid para 430. 
104 ibid. 
105 ibid  para 431.  
106 ibid para 174. 
107 ibid para 210. 
108 ibid para. 430. See also Edward C. Luck, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Growing Pains or 
Early Promise?’ (2010) 24(4) Ethics & International Affairs, 349, 361. 
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2.3.2.3 Erga omnes obligation to prevent MAs? 
 
The notion of jus cogens was introduced into treaty law through the 
Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties as one which is  “accepted and 
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm 
from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.”109 
International crimes that rise to the level of jus cogens carry erga omnes 
obligations.110 Such obligations are owed towards the international 
community as a whole and as a result, each and every member of the 
international community has a ‘legal interest’ in their observance and 
consequently a legal entitlement to demand respect for such obligations.111 
It is recognized that most norms prohibiting MAs rise to the level of 
jus cogens.112 To this extent, there is a debate about whether States are under 
a positive obligation to act to halt their commission.113 As displayed in 
section 2.3.2.1, the ICJ found that States have the obligation to prevent 
genocide in accordance with the principle of due diligence. Because of the 
nature of the case, the ICJ only examined the Genocide Convention and did 
not discuss the obligation of States to prevent other MA crimes under IHRL 
and IHL. A number of authors use the Genocide Convention and its 
interpretation by the ICJ to support R2P with respect to the prevention of 
other MA crimes.114 Strauss for instance maintains that the obligation to 
prevent genocide as an obligation erga omnes raises the question of a general 
obligation of States to prevent the other acts of the same type. He argues that 
the obligation to prevent genocide as assessed by the ICJ “could ultimately 
form the basis of providing guidance on the existence and scope of a duty or 
responsibility to protect.”115 Luke Glanville similarly points out that despite 
refusing to rule on other MA crimes, the ICJ in Bosnia v. Serbia did 
                                                
109 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 
January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331, article 53. 
110 M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes’ (Fall 
1996) 59 Law and Contemporary Problems 63-74, 64. 
111 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (Belgium v. Spain), ICJ Reports, 1970, 3, 
32. 
112 Prosecutor v Kupreskic (Trial Judgment) IT-95-16-T (14 January 2000) para 520. The 
ICTY recognized that “most norms of international humanitarian law, in particular those 
prohibiting war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, are also peremptory norms of 
international law or jus cogens.”  Re the prohibition of war crimes: ICJ Advisory Opinion on 
the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (n 70) 226, para 79; Report of the 
International Law Commission (23 April-1 June and 2 July-10 August 2001) A/56/10 
(SUPP), 284. Re the prohibition against crimes against humanity: ILC A/56/10 (SUPP), 208, 
para 5; M Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law (2nd 
revised ed, the Hague Kluwer Law, 1999) 210. Re the prohibition against genocide: ICJ 
Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention (n 65) 23 et seq.   
113 Chhabra and Zucker (n 88) 56 
114 David Scheffer, ‘Atrocity Crimes: Framing the Responsibility to Protect’ in R.H. Cooper 
and J.V. Hohler (eds.), Responsibility to Protect: The Global Moral Compact for the 21st 
Century (Palgrave MacMillan 2009), 77, 80-81; Rosenberg (n 92) 461, 470. 
115 Strauss (n 49) 317. 
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acknowledge that States may carry obligations other than the prevention of 
genocide that “protect essential humanitarian values and which may be owed 
erga omnes.”116 Glanville thus puts forward the compelling argument that 
“the other ‘responsibility to protect’ crimes could constitute breaches of 
peremptory norms, and their prevention may be considered erga omnes.”117 
 
2.3.2.4 IHL obligation to ‘respect’ and ‘ensure respect’  
 
Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions which reads: 
“The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for 
the present Convention in all circumstances”118 is today generally seen as 
“quasi-constitutional” given its erga omnes character.119 It is also considered 
as imposing on all States120 an obligation to take a range of measures in order 
to induce state organs, private individuals and other contracting States to 
comply with the Conventions.121 The obligation ‘to respect’ implies that 
States have the obligation “to do everything it can to ensure that the rules in 
question are respected by its organs as well as by all others under its 
jurisdiction.”122 To ‘ensure respect’ on the other hand implies that States, 
“whether engaged in a conflict or not must take all possible steps to ensure 
that the rules are respected by all, and in particular by parties to the 
conflict.”123 This includes the rules applicable both in times of war and in 
peacetime.124 Lastly, ‘in all circumstances’ implies that “the application of the 
Convention does not depend on the character of the conflict.”125 
                                                
116 Bosnia v Serbia (n 99) para 147. 
117 Luke Glanville, ‘The Responsibility to Protect Beyond Borders’ (2012) Vol. 12 (1) HRLR 
26. 
118 GC I, GC II, GC III, GC IV (n 52) article 1. See also: Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise 
Doswald-Beck (International Committee of the Red Cross), Study of Customary International 
Humanitarian Law (Cambridge University Press, 2005), rule 144 ‘Ensuring Respect for 
International Humanitarian Law Erga Omnes’: “States may not encourage violations of 
international humanitarian law by parties to an armed conflict. They must exert their 
influence, to the degree possible, to stop violations of international humanitarian law.” 
119 Prosecutor v Kupreskic (n 112) paras 517-519; ICRC Study of Customary IHL (n 118) rule 
140, FN. 78. 
120 The ICJ recognized Common Article 1 as part of customary international law as well as a 
general principle of humanitarian law applicable also in non-international armed conflicts 
Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. United States of America) (Advisory Opinion) General List No. 70 [1986] ICJ 
Rep 14, para 220. 
121 Carlo Focarelli, ‘Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Soap Bubble?’ 
(2010) 21(1) EJIL 125, 127. 
122 Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Luigi Condorelli, ‘Common Article 1 of the Geneva 
Conventions revisited: Protecting collective interests’ (2000) 82 (837) International Review 
of the Red Cross 67. 
123 ibid. 
124 ibid. See also Jean Pictet, Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
Vol. I  (International Committee of the Red Cross 1952) 26: “if it is to keep its solemn 
engagements, the State must of necessity prepare in advance, that is to say in peacetime, the 
legal, material or other means of loyal enforcement of the Convention as and when the 
occasion arises.” 
125 ibid 27. 
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This obligation to ‘respect and ensure respect’ is reiterated in 
Additional Protocol I126 and applies not only to international armed conflicts, 
but also to non-international armed conflicts covered by Common Article 
3.127 
The Commentary to the Geneva Conventions highlights the fact that 
the provisions on the repression of violations have been considerably 
strengthened with the obligation to punish grave breaches of IHL: “The 
Contracting Parties are no longer merely required to take the necessary 
legislative action to prevent or repress violations. They are under obligation 
to search for, and prosecute, guilty parties, and cannot evade their 
responsibility.”128 Article 1 is thus “deliberately invested with imperative 
force.”129 
Fleck argues that Common Article 1 is to be recognized through the 
lens of “sovereignty as responsibility”.130 In Fleck’s view, IHL imposes 
responsibility and legal accountability on States for their actions and 
omissions.131  
 
 
2.3.2.5 Obligation to criminalize, prosecute, punish and take 
other measures contributing to the prevention of MAs 
 
The importance of criminalization, prosecution and punishment for 
effective punishment has been recognized by the ICJ in Serbia v. Bosnia: 
“one of the most effective ways of preventing criminal acts, in general, is to 
provide penalties for persons committing such acts, and to impose those 
penalties effectively on those who commit the acts one is trying to 
prevent.”132 In that sense, IL instruments as well as Statutes and jurisprudence 
of international tribunals specify the obligations of States with regards to the 
prevention of war crimes and crimes against humanity through 
criminalization, prosecution and punishment. This sub-section will assess 
these, as well as the obligations relevant to other measures that contribute to 
the prevention of MAs. 
The Rome Statute provides for the investigation and prosecution of 
perpetrators of MAs before the ICC.133 However, since not all States are 
                                                
126 AP I (n 52) article 1 (4). 
127 Boisson de Chazournes and Condorelli (n 122): “While conflicts of a non-international 
character as defined by Add. Protocol II are not explicitly covered by the obligation to 
respect and to ensure respect, they can nonetheless be considered as indirectly falling within 
the purview of the provision, insofar as Protocol II is merely an elaboration of common 
Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions, a fact stated in tis Article 1, paragraph 1.” 
128 Pictet (n 124) 27, fn1. 
129 ibid 27. 
130 Dieter Fleck, ‘International Accountability for Violations of the Lus in Bello : The Impact 
of the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law’ (2006) 11(2) Journal of 
Conflict and Security Law 179, 182. 
131 ibid 181-8. 
132 Bosnia v Serbia (n 99) para 426. 
133 ICC Statute (n 54). 
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parties and due to its size and statutory mandate, the ICC can only prosecute a 
very limited number of offenders. 
 
As per war crimes, States must incorporate IHL into their domestic 
legal system,134 through the prosecution and effective punishment of 
individuals committing war crimes or ordering their commission.135 States 
must investigate alleged cases of war crimes committed by their nationals, 
their armed forces, or on their territory and prosecute the suspects.136 Where 
appropriate, States must also search for any person(s), regardless of 
nationality, who have allegedly committed war crimes, and bring them before 
their national courts.137 Even if a home country does not investigate and 
prosecute, it has the obligation to extradite suspects of violations to another 
State for trial, provided that the latter has produced a prima facie case against 
the alleged violators.138 
States are also required to disseminate IHL in both peacetime and time 
of armed conflict to the armed forces and the civilian population.139 They 
must ensure that their organs and officials, in particular their armed forces do 
not commit war crimes on their own territory or beyond.140 For this purpose, 
States must make legal advisers on the application of IHL available to 
military commanders.141 Military commanders must be required to prevent 
the commission of war crimes by their subordinates,142 if necessary to report 
breaches143 and to impose disciplinary or criminal punishment.144 IHL 
obligations are not only applicable to the direct involvement of States in 
armed conflict. States must also not encourage the commission of war crimes, 
and must use their influence to prevent or halt war crimes.145  
With regards to crimes against humanity, States have not adopted any 
convention on the prevention of crimes against humanity. There is thus no 
codified obligation for States to prevent these crimes. Crimes against 
humanity are however prohibited under CIL, and therefore all States have the 
obligation to refrain from committing them.146 Strauss argues that the 
                                                
134 GC III (n 52) article 129, para 1: States must “enact all legislation necessary to provide 
effective penal sanctions.”  
135 Re obligation to prosecute grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions: GC I (n 52) articles 
49-50, GC II (n 52) articles 50-51; GC III (n 52) articles 129-130; GC IV (n 52) articles 146-
147; AP I (n 52) article 85). Re the prosecution and punishment of criminal offences 
connected with non-international armed conflict: AP II (n 52) article 6.  
136 GC I (n 52) article 49(2); GC II (n 52) article 50(5); GC III (n 52) article 129(2); GC IV (n 
52) article 146(2). See also ICRC Study of Customary IHL (n 118) rules 157 and 158. 
137 For example GC IV (n 52) article 146.  
138 GC I (n 52) article 49(1). 
139 GC I (n 52) article 47; GC II (n 52) article 48; GC III (n 52) article 127; GC IV (n 52) 
article 144; AP I (n 52) article 83; AP II (n 52) article 19. 
140 Common Article 1 of the four GC (n 52). 
141 AP I (n 52) article 82. See also ICRC Study of Customary IHL (n 118) rule 141. 
142 AP I (n 52) article 86(2). 
143 ibid article 87(1). 
144 ibid article 87(3).  
145 ICRC Study of Customary IHL (n 118) rule 144. 
146 Danilenko ‘ICC Statute and Third States’ in Cassesse, Gaeta and Jones (Eds.), The Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, (Vol. II, Oxford University 
Press 2002) 1890; Werle et al (n 76) 218. 
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contours of States obligations relating to crimes against humanity have been 
traced by the jurisprudence of international tribunals.147 
A potential future source of obligations to prevent and punish crimes 
against humanity is the Proposed International Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity,148 which would emphasize the 
duty of States to prevent the commission of crimes against humanity and add 
inter-state cooperation in the prosecution of perpetrators. 
 
2.3.2.6 Conclusions 
 
The above-mentioned legal obligations of States under IHRL and IHL 
will now be summarized and analyzed, in order to draw a clear picture of the 
legal scope of the primary responsibility of States to prevent MA crimes 
under R2P.  
With regards to genocide, all States must “employ all measures 
reasonably available to them so as to prevent genocide as far as possible.”149 
This is an obligation to prevent genocide with ‘due diligence’. As per the 
prevention of war crimes, Common Article 1 of the Geneva Convention 
similarly obliges States to do everything they can to ensure that all, under 
their jurisdiction, respect IHL. Further IHL provisions place specific 
obligations relevant to preventing war crimes on States. This notably includes 
the obligation to incorporate IHL in the domestic legal system, to disseminate 
IHL and to investigate, prosecute as well as punish IHL violations.  
However in regards to crimes against humanity, in the absence of a 
convention, States have no clear obligation to prevent these crimes 
specifically. It can however be argued that the fact that crimes against 
humanity, and for that matter all MA crimes, rise to the level of jus cogens 
and thus carry erga omnes obligations, could establish the positive obligation 
on States to act to prevent their commission. Moreover, it has been suggested 
                                                
147 Ekkehard Strauss, The Emperor’s New Clothes?: The United Nations and the 
Implementation of the Responsibility to Protect (Nomos 2009) 34-35. Strauss maintains that 
similar to the case of genocide and war crimes, States must ensure that their organs and 
officials do not commit crimes against humanity. For this purpose, they “must not condone or 
tolerate any policy of widespread attacks against the civilian population by their organs or 
officials and prevent the commission of crimes against humanity by other within their 
jurisdiction. Beyond their organs and officials, States must not instruct, direct nor exercise 
overall control over groups or individuals to commit crimes against humanity. In addition, 
States must not aid or assist other States to commit crimes against humanity, e.g. through 
supplying weapons in the knowledge that they are being used for this purpose. According to 
the case law of the ad hoc tribunals further obligations imposed on States are more limited 
than those with respect to the crime of genocide and entail primarily that States must provide 
for the prosecution and punishment of those committing crimes against humanity. To this 
end, they must take jurisdiction over crimes against humanity occurring on their territory, but 
are not obliged to establish universal jurisdiction.” 
148 Proposed International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against 
Humanity, drafted by the Crimes Against Humanity Initiative at the Whitney R. Harris World 
Law Institute of Washington University School of Law, August 2010. 
<http://law.wustl.edu/harris/cah/docs/EnglishTreatyFinal.pdf> accessed 25 June 2012. 
149 Bosnia v Serbia (n 99) para 430. 
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that R2P could expand the pre-existing legal obligations of States. Chhabra 
maintains that the President of the General Assembly suggested an answer to 
the affirmative when stating that “it is for member States to consider if the 
responsibility to protect in its non-coercive dimension adds anything to the 
International Law Commission’s Articles or to the provisions of international 
human rights law and international humanitarian law.”150 It could be argued 
from this basis that R2P could have expanded the pre-existing legal 
obligations of States to include an obligation to prevent crimes against 
humanity.  
 
                                                
150 Chhabra and Zucker (n 88) 57; Office of the President of UNGA, Concept Note on the 
Responsibility to Protect Populations from Genocide, War Crimes, Ethnic Cleansing and 
Crimes against humanity, Jul. 17, 2009, available at 
<http://www.un.org/ga/president/63/interactive/protect/conceptnote.pdf> accessed 25 June 
2012. 
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3. ROLE OF NHRIs IN THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF STATES 
PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PREVENT 
 
R2P added an agenda for action to the pre-existing IL obligations of 
States to prevent certain grave violations of IL. The scope of R2P preventive 
measures range from those aimed at preventing peacetime atrocities to 
measures aimed at preventing atrocities committed in the context of an armed 
conflict. Moreover, direct preventive measures are not the only measures 
needed to prevent MAs; general structural measures addressing the root 
causes of MAs and armed conflicts are also required. As explained in the 
introductory chapter,151 although NHRIs have broad mandates to protect and 
promote human rights, there are strong arguments for these institutions to 
devote special attention to the implementation of R2P preventive measures.  
The first section of this chapter will specify the role of NHRIs in the 
implementation of States’ legal obligations, and will then go on to discuss the 
major elements to be included in an effective prevention operational 
framework. The second section will analyze the role NHRIs can play in the 
practical implementation of States’ MA prevention obligations and 
prevention operational framework.  
 
3.1 Implementing States obligations to prevent 
under R2P 
 
3.1.1 NHRIs and the implementation of States legal 
obligations 
NHRIs can take many forms, such as Ombudsmen, Hybrid Human 
Rights Ombudsmen or Human Rights Commissions.152 In all cases, NHRIs 
are not government departments and they should in fact be independent from 
the State.153 As such, they do not implement the legal obligations of States 
directly. NHRIs rather contribute to the practical implementation of States’ 
obligations through their mandate to promote and protect human rights, most 
notably with their monitoring functions. The scope of their agenda should be 
                                                
151 See section 1.3. 
152 The categorization of NHRIs is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
153 Paris Principles (n 24) Composition and guarantees of independence and pluralism. 
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defined in terms of IHRL, including the States’ international obligations to 
respect and ensure respect of human rights by non-state actors. This means 
that NHRIs should monitor the steps taken by the government to ensure that 
domestic law and practice constitute a framework that effectively addresses 
human rights violations by all. NHRIs should also make policy and 
legislation recommendations for more effective protection of citizens from 
human rights abuses.154 
NHRIs occupy a unique position by being “within the State structure 
and yet independent and where necessary, critical.”155 In order for a NHRI to 
be effective, members and staff should not receive any instruction from 
government ministers or other public officials directly or indirectly.156 The 
funding ties can complicate this relationship as governments are urged to 
respect and ensure the independence of NHRIs while at the same time being 
required to fund them.157 The autonomy from the State is crucial to enable 
NHRIs to effectively carry out their mandate, and where necessary investigate 
human rights abuses from the government and government actors.158 
NHRIs do not have the power to compel authorities to respond to their 
recommendations directly. Although NHRIs should be able to investigate, 
they should not have judicial powers. 159 They are not a replacement or an 
alternative to a properly functioning judiciary whose findings are enforced. 
NHRIs can however constitute an effective complement to State institutions 
in the promotion and protection of human rights standards.160 Pegram points 
out that their lack of formal coercive faculties does not necessarily diminish 
the accountability they are able to provide as “robust formal design may be of 
little consequence when confronted by a highly dysfunctional political and 
legal appartus unwilling or unable to close the accountability circle.”161 
NHRIs should nevertheless have the power to follow-up on their 
reports and recommendations.162 Relevant authorities should be required to 
respond within a specified time to recommendations or findings made by their 
NHRI.163 Amnesty International recommends that this should “include a 
suitable framework within which the NHRI may compel the relevant 
authority to explain and report to the NHRI, within a reasonable period of 
time as to why, for example, it has not followed and did not apply 
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recommendations made by human rights bodies or thematic mechanisms”164 
and that governments should “undertake an obligation to respond, within a 
reasonable time, to the case-specific as well as more general findings, 
conclusions and recommendations made by the NHRI.”165 Moreover, 
Amnesty International suggests that the government’s response should be 
made public and in cases where the government fails or refuses to respond or 
implement recommendations, the NHRI should take all possible measures to 
press the government for a response. This includes through publicity by the 
media, parliament and the international community, for example by bringing 
the case to the attention of international human rights bodies.166 Making use 
of the pressure tools available to them will help to change interests, 
behaviour, incentives, and ultimately raise the political cost of non-
compliance.167 
Moreover, NHRIs should also have the power to refer their findings 
and recommendations to courts or special tribunals for adjudication to secure 
compliance with their recommendations.168 In the case where their 
recommendations to investigate and bring prosecutions are ignored, NHRIs 
should continue to insist that the relevant authorities take up the case. This 
includes through the necessary forms of domestic and international pressure, 
and when possible, by filing an action for judicial review challenging the 
decision of the prosecuting authorities.169 
The potential role of NHRIs in the implementation of legal obligations 
differs from the one of non-governmental human rights organizations. NHRIs 
are established by the State, have different composition, structure, status as 
well as different tools available to them to hold the State bodies accountable 
with regards to human rights standards.170 Their official status within 
government should help them engage and coordinate their activities with 
other institutions. It should also allow them to access information and 
documents that are not as easily accessible by NGOs and give rise to a closer 
engagement with government bodies.171  
The privileged position of NHRIs as an intermediate between the State 
and its citizens presents a number of difficulties, the most notable being that 
they have to find a balance between engaging with State bodies while 
remaining independent.172 If they are to influence State policy and decisions, 
NHRIs must establish a close relationship with government bodies and actors. 
Yet, in order to preserve their public legitimacy, they cannot be seen as a 
government subordinate. In order for NHRIs to remain independent and thus 
effective, they must not tolerate any State interference in their work.173 
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The performance of NHRIs in its contribution to the practical 
implementation of States’ legal obligations heavily depends on its overall 
effectiveness. This thesis is concerned with the prospects and challenges 
facing NHRIs in relation to R2P specifically, and will thus not go through the 
various effectiveness benchmarks in detail.174 
 
3.1.2 Relevant implementation measures  
 
While it is the IL roots that give R2P its weight, history has shown 
that legal obligations are not sufficient to prevent genocide, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. What is needed is a framework for targeted actions 
to prevent such crimes and to contribute to the implementation of the existing 
legal obligations.175 That is exactly what R2P has generated. In addition to 
reformulating pre-existing legal obligations of States relating to MA 
prevention, R2P represents a stimulus to implement policy agendas such as 
early-warning, capacity building, protection of civilians, and the prevention 
of armed conflict in order to meet its international legal obligations.176  
The prevention aspect of the first pillar of R2P faces almost no 
political opposition. The challenge is rather of an institutional and intellectual 
nature: “figuring out what needs to be done, how to do it, and who should do 
it.”177 The 2009 UNSG R2P report and the General Assembly debate that 
followed represent the first step in delimiting this operational framework. The 
three-pillar framework and general parameters outlined therein remain to be 
implemented. As acknowledged by Ban Ki-moon in his 2009 UNSG R2P 
report, much more work remains to be done in this field.178 In fact, the 
specific contours of the prevention agenda is still being debated by 
academics.179 
 
3.1.2.1 Prevention of armed conflict and MAs 
 
The first step of effective prevention is the identification of potential 
atrocity producing situations.  The problem is that there are so many of them, 
including historical grievances and enmities; recent or bitterly rankling social 
traumas; arrogant elites prospering in the midst of widespread poverty; poor 
governance; poor education (including strong prejudice); rapid political, 
social, or economic dislocation; colonial occupation; war; and revolution.180  
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Prevention of armed conflict and the prevention of MAs are not 
synonymous. Conflict prevention is a broad concept in comparison to R2P, 
which has a narrower and more focused agenda to prevent four specific 
crimes: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. 
It is widely accepted that armed conflicts create situations that have the 
potential to generate MA crimes. The prevention of armed conflict thus 
naturally contributes to halting MAs.181 In line with this perspective, the 
ICISS and the Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan suggested that the 
prevention of armed conflict should be incorporated into the R2P agenda.182  
On the other hand, not all armed conflict gives rise to MAs. Further, 
MA crimes also happen in peacetime. Considering these propositions, the 
International Peace Institute as well as the current UN Secretary-General Ban 
Ki-Moon maintained that the prevention of armed conflict and the prevention 
of MAs should not be subsumed under one another.183  
This means that the two concepts must remain distinct and be 
approached separately in order to develop a suited agenda for action for each. 
It has been argued by Bellamy that what is needed to prevent MAs is an 
approach that: 1) reduces the risk of armed conflict (thereby reducing the 
primary enabling context); 2) addresses the risk of peacetime atrocities; and 
3) includes steps to prevent atrocities within armed conflict.184 Effective 
prevention requires an in-depth knowledge of the preconditions for MAs such 
as social divisions and extreme inequalities among groups.185 It also requires 
to move beyond the tendency to believe that prevention ends when violence 
beings.186 Indeed, prevention tools should be applied throughout all stages of 
a conflict: not only before the initial outbreak of violence, but also to prevent 
the continuance and escalation, as well as to prevent its recurrence.187 
 
3.1.2.2 Structural and direct prevention 
 
In his 2009 UNSG R2P report, Ban Ki-moon concretized the broad 
R2P agreement into specific areas of concern and argued for a 'narrow but 
deep' approach to the R2P policy agenda.188 This holistic approach focuses on 
the four R2P crimes while involving measures ranging from security sector 
reform to equitable economic development. 
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This approach has however been criticized by a number of academics 
arguing that a 'deep' R2P agenda will be hard to institutionalize and will 
prevent R2P from remaining a catalyst for decisive action.189 Those 
academics argue that the four crimes should be used as a checklist for 
deciding whether a situation is worthy of R2P's attention, resources, and 
international engagement and intervention.190 For instance, Evans considers 
that the preventive component of R2P should be confined in scope to direct 
prevention, where MAs are imminent, and that it should not be extended to 
structural prevention, the longer-term prevention efforts.191 Bellamy similarly 
argues that R2P prevention measures must be constrained in two main ways: 
1) by focusing on direct preventive measures, including early-warning, 
preventive diplomacy, preventive deployment and ending impunity, rather 
than more structural preventive measures; and 2) by aiming to prevent the 
four crimes in particular, rather than being concerned with armed conflict in 
general.192 
Most of the world's governments and academics working on the 
prevention of MAs nevertheless agree that in order to address prevention 
effectively, root causes need to be taken seriously. In most cases, by the time 
MAs are imminent, the opportunity for prevention is dramatically reduced, if 
not erased.  
Taking Evans’ ‘Prevention Toolbox’ as a starting point for possible 
prevention measures,193 it appears that States can implement their primary 
responsibility under R2P through the following ‘structural prevention 
measures’: promotion of good governance, promotion of membership in 
international organizations, supporting economic development, supporting 
education for tolerance, community peace-building, promotion of fair 
constitutional structures, promotion of human rights, promotion of rule of 
law, fighting corruption, reforming the security sector, shifting from military 
to civilian governance, developing confidence-building measures, and 
improving small weapons control. States can only implement two of the 
‘direct prevention measures’, being through the establishment of legal dispute 
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resolution mechanisms and economic incentives. The other direct preventive 
measures tend to be more appropriate for prevention under R2P pillar two as 
they stem more from external pressure or assistance.194  
 
The following sections as well as Chapter Four will consider the role 
NHRIs can play in the implementation of the above-mentioned prevention 
measures relevant to the primary responsibilities of States under R2P. 
  
3.2 National Human Rights Institutions and 
Prevention under R2P 
 
As seen under section 3.1.1, NHRIs play a vital role in the practical 
implementation of States’ international obligations. Their mandate allows 
them to engage with all relevant actors at the domestic level and interact with 
international mechanisms to protect human rights. Although NHRIs usually 
have a general mandate to promote and protect all human rights, there are 
strong reasons for them to pay particular attention to the prevention of MAs. 
First, MAs represent the most horrendous violations of human rights. Second, 
while there is an international consensus on R2P, individual States across the 
globe fail to prevent MAs. And third, preventing MAs requires active 
involvement from as many actors as possible, including NHRIs.195 
Effective MA prevention depends on three main factors: detailed 
knowledge of the regions at-risk through analysis and early-warning; 
understanding by the policy-makers of the available prevention measures; and 
the institutional capability to take the necessary measures.196 Every potential 
MA situation has its own dynamics. In order to get an accurate assessment of 
what is happening on the ground, the information needs to be assessed with a 
comprehensive understanding of all the factors at play. In particular, the 
“issues that are resonating, the personalities and local dynamics – political, 
economic, social, cultural, and personal – that are driving them.”197 Moreover, 
as stressed by Ban Ki-moon in his 2009 UNSG R2P report: “if principles 
relating to the responsibility to protect are to take full effect and be 
sustainable, they must be integrated into each culture and society without 
hesitation or condition, as a reflection of not only global but also local values 
and standards.”198 This is where the prevention potential of NHRIs resides, 
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namely their critical role “in translating international human rights norms in a 
way that reflects national contexts and specificities.”199  
NHRIs can also contribute to deterring future human rights violations, 
and halt their escalation to MAs through their general activities carried out 
under their mandate to promote and protect human rights. Most notably, 
NHRIs can contribute to the prevention of MAs by paying particular attention 
to the promotion and protection of economic, social and cultural rights (ESC 
rights) that constitute root causes of MAs.200 With their broad and 
conciliatory powers, NHRIs are well suited to promote and protect ESC 
rights.201 
Depending on their mandate, NHRIs can contribute to the practical 
implementation of the R2P prevention obligations of their governments 
through various activities throughout all stages of a conflict. That is, they may 
take steps: before the initial outbreak of violence; during it to prevent its 
continuance and escalation; and following the outbreak in order to prevent its 
recurrence. Many NHRIs have specialized sub-directorates dedicated to 
human rights issues of particular concern including internally displaced 
persons (IDPs), detainees, indigenous rights, environmental issues, social 
violence and land rights. Before the outbreak of a MA crisis, NHRIs can 
contribute to the prevention with various resources such as their 
documentation and expertise on local rights practices and collaboration with 
civil society organizations. One of the most useful prevention tools of NHRIs 
is their capacity to identify risk factors in sectors that have the potential to 
degenerate into a R2P crisis. As such, NHRIs may assist in the mapping of 
underlying causes of conflict escalation, identify challenges in demobilization 
and ascertain individual legal responsibility. After the outbreak of a crisis that 
has the potential to generate MA crimes, NHRIs can contribute to preventing 
MAs through mediation, monitoring of conflict situations, protection of 
vulnerable groups and individuals at risk, and prosecution of criminal acts.202 
The involvement of NHRIs in the prevention of MAs arises from their 
general functions of monitoring their State’s compliance with its human 
rights obligations, including those regarding the prevention of MAs. NHRIs 
derive their authority in this field from two main international instruments: 
the Paris Principles,203 which is the main source of normative standards for 
NHRIs; and the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture204 
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according to which States can designate their NHRI as a national preventive 
mechanism. 
 
3.2.1 Paris Principles 
 
The Paris Principles were first adopted by NHRIs at an international 
workshop held in Paris in 1991 and marked the beginning of international 
cooperation and standardization of NHRIs. The UN Commission on Human 
Rights and the General Assembly later endorsed the Principles. They are now 
recognized as the principal source of normative standards for NHRIs. The 
Paris Principles are not legally binding upon States. They are rather 
recognized as the minimum conditions that a NHRI must meet to be regarded 
as credible by the international community.  
The Paris Principles set broad and general standards for all NHRIs, 
regardless of their structure type. They establish that a NHRI should be rooted 
in the national Constitution or by a law that precisely lays out its role and 
powers in a mandate as broad as possible. The Principles also assert that 
NHRIs should be pluralist and should cooperate with a range of social and 
political groups and institutions, comprising of non-governmental 
organizations, judicial institutions, professional bodies and government 
departments. They further state that NHRIs should have an infrastructure that 
allows them to conduct their functions, as well as sufficient funding to allow 
the institution “to be independent of the government and not be subjected to 
financial control which might affect this independence.”205 
The functions of NHRIs are described therein as “responsibilities”, 
suggesting their imperative status. The role of NHRIs in the prevention of 
MAs will be assessed below on the basis of the competence and 
responsibilities of NHRIs as elaborated in the Paris Principles. These will be 
divided under three overlapping key elements: the promotion of an effective 
legal framework; the contribution to the implementation of legal frameworks; 
and control mechanisms to support the legal framework and its 
implementation.206 
 
3.2.1.1 Promoting an effective legal framework 
 
The Paris Principles provide that NHRIs should make 
recommendations and proposals to governments on a range of matters 
relating to human rights, including existing and proposed laws.207 Depending 
on their mandate, NHRIs will have the function to provide recommendations 
on draft legislation, identify deficiencies in existing law, and draft legal 
projects in accordance with international human rights standards. NHRIs may 
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use this function to review existing and draft laws and other legislations to 
bring formal domestic legal provisions in line with existing international 
obligations. They should also encourage their governments to ratify 
international human rights instruments without reservations. In order to be 
effective, NHRIs should be enabled to review any law touching upon human 
rights and, where applicable, recommend any amendments that they deem 
appropriate. The recommendations NHRIs make to the government on their 
obligations overlaps with their monitoring functions.208 
To contribute to the implementation of R2P, NHRIs could for 
example encourage governments to develop national action plans that include 
specific R2P strategies addressing structural causes of R2P such as legislation 
for the protection of minorities and elimination of political, social and 
economic discrimination.209 They could also encourage the State to take 
specific steps or implement particular strategies to improve the domestic 
implementation of R2P. 
 
3.2.1.2 Contributing to the implementation of the legal 
framework 
 
The Paris Principles also provide the methods of operation and powers 
of NHRIs. The Principles state that NHRIs may investigate, through the 
initiation and publication of inquiries, any issue falling within their 
competence without authorization from any higher authority.210 They may 
also meet regularly and make their opinions and recommendations public.211 
NHRIs also contribute to the implementation of the legal framework through 
the training of public officials.  
 
3.2.1.2.1 Investigation 
 
The Paris Principles state that NHRIs may investigate any issue falling 
under their competence without authorization from any higher authority. To 
achieve this, they are entitled to hear any person and gather any evidence 
needed to investigate the matters falling within their competence.212 In 
conflict situations, NHRIs should be able to record the facts and make public 
findings on those facts to allow NGOs and individuals to have a stronger 
factual basis to initiate proceedings. They should also document particular 
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human rights problems that may occur in situations of conflict, including the 
recruitment of child soldiers or the use of sexual violence as a weapon.213 
NHRI technical teams with forensic and medical expertise could be 
rapidly deployed to scenes of mass violations to carry out crime scene 
investigations, collect witness testimony and forensic analysis, as well as 
attest to the actions of the parties involved. This function can be useful to 
gather accurate reliable information in the immediate aftermath of a R2P 
crisis. It can thus help analyze the events leading up to MA situations and the 
conflicting reports coming from various sources. It can also refute attempts 
by officials to cover up or deny evidence of MAs. Pegram asserts that in 
controlled environments “this offer[s] one of the few channels of redress for 
victims of abuse by state officials.”214  
Although their authority to investigate individual complaints may be 
restrained, NHRIs should monitor the activities of all relevant public and 
private bodies that may impact human rights, including businesses and 
individuals. Allegations of human rights violations and calls for prosecution 
following a robust investigation carry a high political cost. This might 
represent the only way to secure accountability of political actors where a 
functioning legal system is lacking.215 (The value of the investigation function 
of NHRIs will be discussed in greater detail under Section 3.2.1.3.2 on the 
monitoring function.) 
 
3.2.1.2.2 Training of public officials 
 
Another aspect of the preventive work of NHRIs is the education and 
training of public officials. The Paris Principles state that NHRIs should aim 
to make public officials and social actors more aware of human rights and 
their obligations through education and training.216 In the 2009 UNSG R2P 
report, Ban Ki-moon underscores that “when aimed at critical actors in 
society, such as the police, soldiers, judiciary and legislators, training can be 
an especially effective tool for prevention purposes.”217 This can be done 
through workshops with police and security forces on their obligations under 
IHRL and IHL. Ensuring that the authorities involved in a MA crisis 
understand the applicable IL and the potential consequences of its breaches 
contributes to changing the behaviour of State actors. R2P modules could also 
be introduced into human rights training aimed at State actors.218 
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3.2.1.3 Control mechanism 
 
NHRIs usually do not have legal enforcement powers, although some 
do possess some legal prerogatives before judicial bodies. They can however 
use some of their functions as control mechanisms. This includes through the 
cooperation with international mechanisms,219 monitoring of atrocity 
producing situations220 and the promotion of public awareness.221 Some 
NHRIs also have quasi-jurisdictional functions.222 
 
3.2.1.3.1 Cooperation with international mechanisms 
 
The Paris Principles assert that NHRIs should monitor and advise on 
State compliance with international standards and cooperate with regional and 
international bodies, such as treaty bodies and special procedures of the 
Commission on Human Rights. This includes attending hearings and 
producing parallel reports on the compliance of treaty prevention obligations 
based on the information they collect.223 NHRIs should also cooperate with 
the UN and other regional, national and international institutions competent in 
the promotion and protection of human rights.224 They may for example 
organize follow-up meetings with civil society and State bodies and promote 
national action to implement recommendations on the prevention of MAs.225 
Specific to the context of R2P, NHRIs may also “facilitate international fact-
finding into whether national authorities have manifestly failed to protect 
their populations.”226 
 
3.2.1.3.2 Monitoring 
 
NHRIs should monitor the government's compliance with their 
international human rights obligations and provide advice and 
recommendations.227 The Paris Principles state that monitoring the general 
human rights situation as well as specific areas of concern is an essential 
function of NHRIs.228 Moreover, no public entity should be exempted from 
this monitoring function. NHRIs should most importantly scrutinize law 
enforcement entities, including the police, the military, intelligence services 
and other security services. They should have all the investigative powers 
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necessary to effectively carry out this function. As such, they should have the 
authority to initiate and publish inquiries falling within their general 
monitoring function. Such inquiries include monitoring, public hearings of 
witnesses and the release of public reports containing recommendations for 
action to the relevant authorities.  
In a MA crisis, NHRIs can for instance monitor the situation of 
persons and groups at-risk, such as IDPs, to ensure that their rights are being 
respected.229 NHRIs can also identify challenges in demobilization and make 
recommendations to the authorities that are capable of taking appropriate 
measures. In the context of their monitoring functions, NHRIs could request 
specific information on the actions taken by the government in the 
implementation of R2P.230 
The monitoring function is crucial in shifting political action and raise 
public awareness on specific human rights issues. In cases where NHRIs have 
access to legal forums, they may initiate actions on behalf of individual 
victims, vulnerable groups or contest the legal standing of legislation.231 
When parties reject mediation efforts after the outbreak of a R2P crisis, 
information gathering may be the most useful tool available to NHRIs to 
prevent the escalation of violence. Reliable information may be scarce in such 
contexts and the gathering of information can help hold actors accountable for 
their actions.232  
Detention facilities constitute a key-domain of rights violations, 
including possible atrocity-producing situations. Powers of access without 
prior authorization and jurisdiction over detention facilities are therefore 
crucial in effectively preventing MAs. This is particular relevant for cases of 
torture. The Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture (OPCAT) 
sets specific functions for NHRIs in the prevention of torture. (This will be 
discussed in more detail under Section 3.2.2.) 
 
 3.2.1.3.2.1 Early-warning 
 
Of particular relevance to R2P Pillar One activities is the work of 
NHRI early-warning systems designed to monitor situations with the 
potential to spiral into human rights violations and MA crisis. After the 
outbreak of an MA crisis, the early-warning system can work in the 
prevention of its escalation. Pegram furthermore highlights that early-warning 
activities “may also provide powerful and concrete evidence that a State was 
aware of the risk of atrocities and yet manifestly failed to protect its 
population.”233   
 As Bellamy puts it: “international actors, states and local 
communities have a better chance of preventing the escalation of conflict into 
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violence and MAs if they are warned about the impending threat. Advance 
warning provides decision-makers with evidence to support priority-setting 
and informs debate about appropriate responses to the threat of violent 
conflict.”234 NHRIs are ideally placed to set up an early-warning system as 
they often fulfill the requirements of James Sutterlin’s criteria for an effective 
early-warning system, namely : 1) access to information; 2) analysis 
capabilities; and 3) a communication channel to decision-makers capable of 
authorizing timely and effective preventive measures.235  
NHRIs could, when their mandate allows, establish an early-warning 
mechanism. This could be made possible even if early-warning is not an 
explicit function. For example, some NHRIs that have the mandate to develop 
strategies for the promotion and protection of human rights could use this 
function to justify the creation of an early-warning system.236 
 
3.2.1.3.3 Promoting public awareness 
 
NHRIs can contribute to deterring potential MAs by promoting public 
awareness through human rights education campaigns for the public.237 The 
Paris Principles state that NHRIs shall publicize human rights and efforts to 
combat discrimination by increasing public awareness, especially through 
information and education and by making use of all press organs.238 The 
ability of NHRIs to counter the government discourse may be critical in 
preventing potential MA crises.239 
Although raising awareness through education and training already 
contributes to the implementation of R2P, NHRIs could do more by issuing 
factsheets and publicizing information through the media and educational 
curriculums explaining the R2P principle and the responsibilities of the State 
towards its population.240  
By encouraging respect for human rights at the local level, NHRIs 
contribute to the prevention and escalation of violence and human rights that 
may lead to MAs. In the context of a MA crisis, NHRIs can reinforce their 
community-based training programmes and activities to promote the respect 
of the rights of minorities with different political views or cultural, ethnic or 
linguistic backgrounds. In cases where the root of the conflict lies in a 
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situation of inequality, NHRIs can help the majority of the population to 
understand the nature of the grievances and press the need to address them. 
Where the crisis has resulted in a large number of IDPs, NHRIs can 
familiarise the persons in the areas where the persons are displaced on the 
rights of IDPs.241 
 
3.2.1.3.4 Quasi-jurisdictional function 
 
NHRIs have the ability to bridge conflicting positions and halt 
potential MA situations through their quasi-jurisdictional functions. The Paris 
Principles do not require NHRIs to handle complaints and petitions from 
individuals alleging that their human rights have been violated. However, 
where NHRIs have such quasi-jurisdictional competence, the Paris Principles 
state that NHRI’s function may be based on: seeking an amicable settlement 
through conciliation, a binding decision or on the basis of confidentiality; 
informing petitioners of their rights and available remedies, and promoting 
access to them; hearing complaints and transmitting them to the competent 
authorities; and making recommendations to the competent authorities.242 In 
such cases, NHRIs should have the authority to compel witnesses to appear 
before their monitors and call for evidence, and should be able to recommend 
sanctions in the case of refusal.243 
Where a government is legally bound to respond to the reports of its 
NHRI, it is under greater pressure to answer for its actions and omissions in a 
public forum. This can act as an important accountability mechanism.244 The 
standard NHRI function of passing on complaints to the implicated 
government body can however be problematic where it may endanger the 
complainants.245 
 
3.2.2 Optional Protocol to the Convention against 
Torture 
 
OPCAT246 was adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 
2002 and entered into force in December 2006. It does not create new 
normative standards. OPCAT rather reinforces the obligations to prevent 
torture found under articles 2 and 16 of the Convention against Torture 
(CAT)247 by establishing a system of regular unannounced preventive visits to 
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places of detention by international and national mechanisms, namely the 
Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and “national preventive 
mechanisms” (NPM) established in States that have ratified the Protocol.  
OPCAT contains no specific requirement with regards to the structure 
of NPMs. A State may therefore set up a new Optional Protocol-based 
mechanism, designate the responsibility to an existing body (such as its 
NHRI) or to several mechanisms.248 The Protocol however requires States to 
“give due consideration” to the Paris Principles when establishing NPMs.249  
NPMs should be independent from the State250 and have a mandate to 
conduct regular unannounced visits to all places where persons are deprived 
of their liberty.251 They are also required to make recommendations on 
existing or draft legislations to the relevant authorities.252 NPM should be 
granted access to all relevant information.253 The NPM also has the right to 
follow-up on their recommendations and State parties are required to enter 
into dialogue with the NPM regarding implementation.254 NPMs should also 
prepare an annual report of their activities, which should be made public and 
disseminated by the authorities.255  
The mandate of NPMs differs in both its objective and scope from the 
investigative visits conducted by NHRIs, that aim to document and respond to 
individual complaints.256 Existing NHRIs might therefore not meet all the 
requirements of OPCAT. Taking up a new mandate with a focus on 
prevention, rather than protection or investigation, will almost always require 
amendments to legislation, organizational restructuring and the provision of 
additional human, logistical and financial resources. NHRIs will also have to 
review their working methods, structure and professional composition.257 
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4. Case study of Colombia – Means 
and tools of the Defensoría del 
Pueblo in the Implementation of 
R2P  
 
The Colombian DP acts as a highly interesting example of the role 
that a NHRI can play in the prevention of MAs. In addition to being 
experienced with conflict-related violence, the DP is enabled to effectively 
participate in the prevention of instances of such violence. Most notably, the 
DP has exceptional functions to promote and defend both human rights and 
IHL and has established an early-warning system flagging imminent risks of 
mass violations of human rights and IHL against civilian populations.  
This chapter starts by describing the context of the MAs in Colombia 
and assesses the State’s MA prevention obligations. It then goes on to assess 
the means and tools available to the DP to prevent MAs. Finally, this chapter 
evaluates the practical challenges of the DP in its prevention capacity. It does 
so by looking beyond the work of the DP itself and makes an analysis of the 
institutional entanglement surrounding its work.  
 
4.1 Background 
 
The internal conflict in Colombia is the longest lasting conflict of the 
Western Hemisphere and is very complex. The following sub-sections will 
describe the Colombian context and specificities. The information relating to 
the conflict is not intended to be exhaustive. It rather aims to provide a 
general idea of the context in which the DP is operating. 
 
4.1.1 Conflict history 
  
Colombia is a South American country of about 46 million 
inhabitants. It is an ethnically diverse State with 58% of the population 
identifying as mestizo, 20% white, 14% mulatto, and about 10% Afro-
Colombians and Indigenous groups.258 Colombia has one of the oldest 
democracies of the continent, yet it has been deeply affected by violence and 
a conflict that has been going on for over half a century. Historically, its 
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rugged terrain made it difficult to establish State control over large parts of 
the territory.259 High rates of poverty and a long history of inequalities and 
impunity have also contributed to crime and violence.260 
In the 1950s and 1960s, a number of leftist guerrilla groups, with their 
own ideology and political and military strategies, formed as a response to 
State neglect and poverty.261 The most significant movements included the 
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), Ejercito de 
Liberacion Nacional (ELN), and Movimiento 19 de Abril (M-19). The Liberal 
government of President Virgilio Barco (1986-90) succeeded in getting M-19 
to demobilize and in incorporating them into the political process. However, 
the FARC and ELN are still in combat today.262 
The cocaine mafia began to operate in the 1970s and within a short 
time, the drug trade developed the drug trade into a powerful industry with its 
own plantations, laboratories, transportation services and protection. Drug 
trafficking has helped to perpetuate Colombia's conflict by providing earnings 
to the left and right-wing armed groups.  Institutional efforts to improve the 
situation in the country are now confronted by violence coming from the 
illegal armed groups linked to drug trafficking and other organized crime.263  
To protect their lands from the leftist guerrillas, wealthy right-wing 
landowners organized to create paramilitary groups coordinated by the 
Autodefensas Undidas de Colombia (AUC) in the 1980s.264 
The Liberal and Conservative parties, which dominated the political 
sphere through most of the 18th and 19th Century, were weakened by their 
perceived inability to resolve the causes of violence.265 In 2002, Alvaro 
Uribe, an independent, was elected as President. Uribe had an aggressive plan 
to reduce violence in Colombia by addressing the problem of paramilitary 
groups, defeating the leftist guerrilla groups, and combating drug-
trafficking.266 Negotiations with the AUC paramilitaries resulted in a 2003 
agreement in which the AUC agreed to demobilize its members by the end of 
2005. After more than 30,000 members had demobilized, the group disbanded 
in 2006.267 Demobilized members were accused of gross human rights abuses 
and collusion with the Colombian army in their fight against the FARC and 
ELN. According to the Justice and Peace Law,268 paramilitaries that confess 
to their atrocities are offered dramatically reduced sentences. The 
demobilization process has been criticized for failing to provide adequate 
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punishment for perpetrators and appropriate reparations to the victims.269 On 
a side note, the Supreme Court has lately been investigating former members 
of the Colombian Congress accused of collaboration with paramilitaries. Thus 
far, over 120 members have been investigated, and approximately 40 have 
been convicted.270  
 
4.1.2 Recent dynamics 
 
President Juan Manuel Santos took office in August 2010. He has 
taken Colombia in a new direction pursuing social, economic and political 
reforms.271 Santos has publicly recognized the internal armed conflict, which 
had been denied by previous governments.272 In June 2011 he signed Law 
1448, also known as the Victim's and Land Restitution Law,273 in the 
presence of the UNSG Ban Ki-moon. This law aims to return millions of 
acres of land to displaced persons and provide compensation to all victims of 
the conflict, including victims of the government's security forces. 
While the number of FARC combatants is now dramatically reduced, 
the group still has thousands of fighters conducting illegal acts. Moreover, not 
all paramilitaries demobilized and from those that did, many have returned to 
paramilitary and criminal activities. One difficulty with the demobilization 
program has been to reintegrate demobilized forces into law-abiding civilian 
life. Widespread atrocities continue to be perpetuated by newly formed illegal 
armed groups whose members include re-armed paramilitaries. These new 
groups do not share the political ideology of the AUC, that is to defeat the 
guerrillas. They rather have purely criminal purposes, such as drug 
trafficking.274  
 
4.1.3 MA crimes in the context of the Colombian 
armed conflict 
 
All sides to the conflict have committed atrocities. The MAs taking 
place in Colombia include: killings and attacks against civilians; forced 
displacement; child soldier recruitment; sexual violence; enforced 
disappearances and kidnappings; and anti-personnel landmine incidents. This 
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section will briefly describe each of these situations to paint the context in 
which the DP is operating.  
 
4.1.3.1 Killings and attacks against civilians 
 
There have been ongoing attacks and killings by the armed groups 
especially against: rights defenders; journalists; teachers; community leaders; 
candidates campaigning for elections; trade unionists; indigenous and Afro-
Colombian leaders; leaders of displaced persons; and victims of paramilitaries 
seeking justice or land restitution. Colombia, in particular, has the highest 
number of trade unionists killed every year, worldwide. Threats to trade 
unionists are mainly attributed to paramilitary successor groups.275 
Over the last decade the Colombian forces have committed a number 
of extrajudicial killings of civilians, in particular in the context of the “false 
positive” scandal.276 This scandal broke in Soacha in 2008 when journalists 
discovered that the army was systematically killing civilians, dressing them in 
rebel uniforms and claiming them as combat kills. This was in response to the 
pressure to boost body counts and the policy in place of rewarding guerrilla 
combat kills. The murders occurred throughout Colombia and a number of 
brigades were implicated. A total of 51 members of the Colombian armed 
forces were subsequently dismissed. General Mario Montoya, the commander 
of the Colombian army, also stepped down following this scandal. The Office 
of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia (OHCHR-
Colombia) estimates that this vague of “false positive” may have resulted in 
over 3,000 victims of extrajudicial killings by State forces, most of which 
occurred between 2004 and 2008.277 
4.1.3.2 Forced displacement  
 
As a result of the violent conflict, Colombia has the World’s second 
largest population of IDPs after Sudan. The UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees evaluates that Colombia has 4.3 million IDPs.278 The main cause of 
displacement is the struggle of illegal armed groups for territorial control over 
natural resources and activities related to drug trafficking.279 
Ethnic minorities such as indigenous and afro-Colombians have 
historically been among the most affected by forced displacement. This is 
mainly because ethnic minorities are often located in areas of high 
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commercial interest for mining and agricultural industries or in strategic areas 
for drugs and arms trade and for territorial control in the conflict hostilities.280 
In response to the government's land restitution efforts, there has been 
a rise in killings, threats and attacks against leaders of displaced communities 
campaigning for land recovery.281 
 
4.1.3.3 Child soldier recruitment 
 
Although both guerrilla and paramilitary groups have recruited 
children,282 the FARC is considered to be the biggest recruiter of child 
soldiers.283 The illegal organized armed groups are present in most 
departments and have the capacity to recruit children. In 2011, OHCHR-
Colombia registered a disturbingly high number of crimes committed against 
children in numerous departments, including cases of recruitment and threats 
of recruitment.284 
 
4.1.3.4 Sexual violence  
 
Although conflict-related sexual violence affects both men and 
women, it disproportionately affects women. About 20% of the women 
displaced by the conflict report the fear of sexual violence as the cause. The 
DP documented in 2008 that 15.8% of internally displaced women have been 
victims of sexual violence.285 The magnitude of this issue has led the 
Constitutional Court to issue a decision in 2008 recognizing that sexual 
violence against women is “an habitual, extended, systematic and invisible 
practice in the context of the Colombian armed conflict ... [perpetrated] by all 
illegal armed groups, and in some isolated cases, by individual agents of the 
public security forces."286 The Constitutional Court also noted that internally 
displaced women were particularly vulnerable.287  
Sexual violence is one of the conflict-related crimes with the highest 
level of impunity. This is due to particular obstacles that women face in 
reporting situations, the lack of legal actors training on gender issues, the lack 
                                                
280 ibid 12. 
281 HRW, ‘2012 World Report’ (n 270).  
282 Amnesty International, ‘Annual Report 2011 - The state of the world’s human rights 
(Colombia)’ (2011). 
283 HRW, ‘2012 World Report’ (n 270). 
284 UNHCHR, ‘Report on the situation of human rights in Colombia’ (n 272) 14.  
285 Defensoría del Pueblo, Informe Defensorial ‘Promoción y Monitoreo de los Derechos 
Sexuales y Reproductivos de Mujeres Víctimas de Desplazamiento Forzado con Énfasis en 
Violencias Intrafamiliar y Sexual’, junio 2008. 
<http://www.defensoria.org.co/red/anexos/pdf/02/ninez_08.pdf> accessed 21 May 2012. 
286 Republica de Colombia – Corte Constitucional, Sala Segunda de Revisión, Auto No. 092 
de 2008 (14 april 2008). 
287 ibid. 
 51 
of victim knowledge of their rights, as well as shame and fear experienced by 
victims.288 
 
4.1.3.5 Enforced disappearances and kidnappings 
 
The OHCHR-Colombia noted that despite the existence of a rights-
based legal framework protecting against enforced disappearance,289 the 
magnitude and impunity of the phenomenon is alarming. By October 2011, 
the National Registry of Disappeared Persons recorded 62,745 disappeared 
persons, including 16,884 alleged enforced disappearances.290  
With regards to kidnappings, the government’s figures show an 
increase from the 213 kidnappings in 2009, to 282 in 2010. Amnesty 
International maintains that these are mostly attributed to criminal gangs, but 
that guerrilla groups are responsible for most conflict-related kidnappings.291 
 
4.1.3.6 Anti-personnel landmine incidents 
 
Both the FARC and ELN plant anti-personnel landmines, which injure 
and kill hundreds of civilians every year. The OHCHR-Colombia noted a 
33% increase in 2011 in the number of incidents related to such mines 
compared to 2010.292 
4.1.3.7 Torture 
 
Torture is often used on victims before enforced disappearances or 
killings and it is therefore under-reported. It is also used to repress protest, 
obtain information or confessions and intimidate detainees.293 The Colombian 
Coalition Against Torture asserts that the government’s mechanisms in place 
are ineffective to prevent torture as it “continues to be systematic and 
generalised and there have been no investigations, trials or sentences handed 
down to perpetrators of torture.”294 
 
                                                
288 Sida’s Indevelop Report (n 28)12, citing: Corporación Humanas, Guía para llevar casos 
de violencia sexual. Propuestas de argumentación para enjuiciar crímenes de violencia 
sexual cometidos en el marco del conflicto armado colombiano, Bogotá, julio 2009.	  	  	  
289 Justice and Peace Law (n 273).  
290 UNHCHR, ‘Report on the situation of human rights in Colombia’ (n 272) 12. 
291 Amnesty International (n 282). 
292 UNHCHR, ‘Report on the situation of human rights in Colombia’ (n 272) 15.  
293 Justice for Colombia, News from Colombia, Colombian Government Refuses to Ratify 
Torture Convention, 20 July 2011. 
<http://www.justiceforcolombia.org/news/article/1044/colombian-government-refuses-to-
ratify-torture-convention> accessed 21 May 2012. 
294   ibid. 
 52 
4.2 Colombia's MA prevention obligations 
 
Colombia endorsed the R2P concept as expressed in the 2005 
WSOD.295 In its statement at the General Assembly debate that followed the 
World Summit, Colombia affirmed the seriousness of MA crimes and its 
commitment to the concept of R2P as defined in the 2005 WSOD.296 The 
representative of Colombia highlighted that national capacity would have to 
be strengthened in order to effectively protect civilians, in the following 
areas: rule of law and the elaboration of norms regarding rights enjoyment 
and democratic institutions. Colombia also noted the positive contribution of 
international cooperation in the matter.297 
Colombia is a party to all major international human rights298 and 
humanitarian law instruments.299 It also became party to the Rome Statute in 
2001.300 However, as shown in Chapter 2, regardless of these ratifications all 
States have the obligation to prevent genocide and war crimes. In addition, 
Colombia could also have the obligation to prevent crimes against humanity 
as the thesis argues that it is de lege ferenda.301  
The ratified international instruments relevant to the MAs mentioned 
in section 4.1.3 further specify the scope of Colombia’s prevention 
obligations in relation to each of these crimes.302 
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4.3 Defensoría del Pueblo  
 
The example of the DP in Colombia provides interesting insights into 
the role a NHRI can play in preventing a R2P crisis. The DP, which is fully 
compliant with the Paris Principles303 and responsible for promoting and 
protecting human rights and humanitarian law,304 has numerous tools to 
support the prevention of MAs. This contributes to the practical 
implementation of the R2P obligations of the Colombian State.  
Section 4.3.1 starts by describing the institutional set-up and mandate 
of the DP. Sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 assess the ways in which the institution 
uses its mandate to prevent MAs. Section 4.3.4 then analyzes the institutional 
challenges that the DP is facing in the prevention of MA crimes. 
 
4.3.1 Institutional set-up 
 
The DP is established by the Constitution of 1991 (Constitution)305 
and became operational in 1992 through the Law 24 of 1992 (Law 24).306 
Article 118 of the Constitution creates the position of Defensor del pueblo, 
the Head of the DP, as a member of the Public Ministry.307 The organization 
and functioning of the DP is set out in Law 24.308 The authority of the 
institution is concentrated in the Defensor, who assigns many leading 
positions within the institution. The House of Representatives elects the 
Defensor every four years from a list prepared by the President of the 
Republic.309 Constitutionally, the DP is under the direction of the Inspector 
General.310 In practice however, it has administrative and budgetary 
autonomy311 and the Inspector General does not intervene in its functions and 
management.  
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The DP is decentralized with offices in each of Colombia's 32 
departments. This facilitates accessibility and close work with communities. 
The DP has four Directorates, eight Delegates working with specific subjects 
and four specialized units. The separate Directorates are charged with the 
implementation of the public services provided by the DP, in particular: 1) the 
attention and processing of complaints; 2) the promotion and dissemination of 
human rights; 3) resources and judicial actions; and 4) the National Public 
Defender System.312 The Delegates work on the following separate areas: 1) 
rights of children, youth and women; 2) constitutional and legal affairs; 3) 
collective rights and the environment; 4) indigenous and ethnic minorities; 5) 
criminal and penal policy; 6) monitoring of public policies on human rights; 
7) risk assessment of civilian population as a result of armed conflict 
(including the Early-Warning System); 8) and communication.313 The DP 
also established four specialized offices to respond to the current situations. 
These units specialized on the following topics: 1) coordination for 
international cooperation; 2) health and social security; 3) attention to the 
internally displaced persons; and 4) integral attention to victims314  
 
4.3.2 Mandate 
 
The DP was created in 1991 as part of an effort to restructure the State 
in the midst of a democratic transition, the cessation of armed conflict and 
constitutional revision.315 Articles 281 and 282 of the Constitution and Article 
9 of the Law establish the responsibilities of the Defensor.316 The provisions 
establish that it has a broad mandate to ensure the promotion, exercise and 
dissemination of human rights. The functions of the DP include: to guide and 
instruct Colombians in the exercise and defense of their rights before 
competent authorities or private entities; to disseminate human rights and 
recommend policies for teaching human rights; to invoke the right of habeas 
corpus and interpose actions of tutela;317 to organize and direct public defense 
in the manner provided by law; to bring popular actions in matters relating to 
their competence; to submit draft legislation on matters related to its 
                                                
312 ibid article 18. 
313 ibid article 9(13). The DP shall: “Appoint Delegate Defenders by subject area for the 
study and defence of particular rights.” 
314 ibid article 10: “The Public Defender may delegate his/her functions to the Secretary 
General, National Directors, Delegate Defenders, Regional Defenders, Municipal 
Representatives and other officials of his/her Office, except the obligation to present annual 
reports to Congress.”  
315 Pegram (n 161) 
316 See Annex 2.  
317 A tutela is a constitutional remedy to guarantee that the fundamental rights of citizens are 
protected. For instance, tutela actions may take place when a fundamental right has been 
threatened by the action or omission of a public authority or, in exceptional cases, private 
individuals. 
 55 
competence; to make reports to Congress on the performance of its duties; 
and to carry out other functions prescribed by law.318  
Thus a number of functions prescribed by law, that are included in the 
mandate of the DP,319 comprise of the promotion and protection of IHL. A 
notable example of legislation granting IHL protective function to the DP is 
the Law 387 of 1997.320 This legislation came as a response to the need to 
implement a tool for the prevention of massive human rights violations and 
breaches of IHL that emerged from the degradation of the internal armed 
conflict. Law 387/97 represents an effort to set standards for the DP’s 
protective activities to prevent mass human rights violations and breaches of 
IHL, specifically internal displacement, through monitoring, analysis and risk 
warning.321 
 
4.3.3 Means and tools to prevent of MA crimes 
 
As explained in chapter 3, the prevention of the root causes of MAs 
involves numerous measures ranging from promoting tolerance to promoting 
social justice. Thus, arguably all of the DP’s programs and activities aimed at 
enhancing the protection of human rights that – examples will be displayed in 
this section - contribute, either directly or indirectly, to the prevention of 
MAs. It is also worth highlighting that the MA prevention tools are not neatly 
separated from the response tools available to the DP. For instance, response 
tools fighting impunity can serve as deterrents against more systematic 
occurrences of MA crimes, and thus contribute to prevention. Prevention 
tools also entail those aiming at preventing the escalation of R2P crisis in 
Colombia.  
The following sections will assess the means and tools available to the 
DP that are more clearly oriented towards prevention. The analysis strongly 
relies on the insights obtained in the semi-structured individual interviews 
with staff members and former staff members of the DP as well as with 
organizations working in collaboration with the DP.  
 
4.3.3.1 Moral Office  
 
As stated in section 4.3.2 of the DP’s mandate, the Constitution and 
the Law 24 entrusted the Defensor with important functions relating to the 
promotion and protection of human rights, monitoring of government actions, 
                                                
318 Inter alia Constitution (n 305) article 282. 
319 ibid article 282(8).  
320 Ley 387 de 1997 (Julio 18), Reglamentada Parcialmente por los Decretos Nacionales 951, 
2562 y 2562 y 2569 de 2001 por la cual se adoptan medidas para la prevención del 
desplazamiento forzado; la atención, protección, consolidación y esta estabilización 
socioeconómica de los desplazados internos por la violencia en la República de Colombia.  
321 DP booklet on SAT. 
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and mediation between the government and society.322 Thus, in spite of the 
changes that it can generate through publicity, it appears that the power of the 
DP’s Head is moral rather than coercive.323 The use of the Defensor’s moral 
authority and voice to denounce the state of certain human rights-related 
situations is referred to as Magistratura Moral, or Moral Office.324 If it 
chooses to make its voice heard, it is a powerful tool to carry out its function 
as a human rights watchdog to raise public awareness.325  
Respondents from the DP Specialized Office on integral attention to 
victims asserted that the Moral Office is the most “legitimate and effective” 
prevention tool available to the DP. They opined that even more important 
than the DP reports, is the use of the Moral Office to publicly denounce the 
situation described in the report.326 Once information is denounced, it reaches 
society at large, including local governments, human rights NGOs and the 
communities in general. These bodies can then use the information to serve as 
watchdogs and follow up on particular situations. When aware that a 
community is at risk, local actors are better enabled to take protective 
measures thereby preventing MAs.  
 
4.3.3.2 Community Defenders  
 
The work of Defensor Comunitarios, or Community Defenders, is 
aimed at supporting the Regional DP offices, most notably those working 
within communities that are highly affected by displaced persons. 
Community Defenders are situated in certain regions to strengthen the 
activities of the DP by promoting and protecting the rights of populations at-
risk or whose human rights have been affected by the conflict.  
Community Defenders work closely with IDPs, civil organizations 
working with IDPs and local governments. They might for instance advise 
civil society organizations working with IDPs on legal remedies for victims, 
or help local governments develop policies to implement human rights. They 
are often the only contact that the community has with a State institution, and 
can thus serve as a bridge between the community and the government.  
In turn, Community Defenders also obtain information regarding 
threats of mass human rights violations from civil society organizations. In 
that case, they report this information to the DP Analyst of their region for the 
preparation of risk reports.327 
 
                                                
322 Inter alia, Constitution (n 305) article 282; Law 24 (n 306) article 9.  
323 Law 24 (n306) article 27: “The Public Defender may not exercise judicial or disciplinary 
functions, except those assigned to his Office. His opinions and recommendations shall have 
the strength lent to them by the National Constitution, the law, society, their autonomy, moral 
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324 This moral authority is most notably stated in Law 24 (n 306) article 9(3). 
325 United States Agency for International Development, ‘Assessment of USAID/Colombia 
Assistance to the Public Ministry’ (11 August 2011) 22. 
326 Interview with Staff members of the Specialized Office for Comprehensive Attention to 
Victims, DP, (Bogotá, Colombia, April 2012). 
327 See section 4.3.3.3 Early-Warning System.  
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4.3.3.3 Early-warning system   
 
In 2001, the DP implemented the Sistema de Alertas Tempranas, or 
Early-Warning System (SAT) for the prevention of massive human rights and 
IHL violations. It was created by USAID in collaboration with the 
government of Colombia. This instrument was put into place to promote a 
policy of prevention in the work of the DP and mobilize action from the State 
to prevent armed actors from committing human rights and IHL violations. In 
2003, Resolution No. 250 created a DP Delegate for the Risk Assessment of 
The Civilian Population Resulting From Armed Conflict,328 to support and 
provide strategic direction to the SAT.   
The SAT plays a crucial role in developing policies to prevent mass 
human rights violations by monitoring incidents of the armed conflict and 
alerting the authorities to threats of massive violations of human rights. SAT 
consists of a national network of analysts conducting field investigations and 
issuing risk reports and follow-up reports regarding the potential threats or 
violations of human rights. The reports which contain recommendations on 
actions that prevent and mitigate the risk of violations, are presented to the 
authorities.   
Information about the risks of mass human rights violations in a 
community is normally communicated by the DP Community Defenders329 to 
SAT Regional Analysts. Regional Analysts are present in all regions of 
Colombia, with the exception of the peninsular region of San Andrés y 
Providencia where the conflict has not spread. The threats are evaluated and 
processed into risk reports drafted by the Regional Analysts and revised by 
staff at the central level of the DP Delegate for the Risk Assessment of The 
Civilian Population Resulting From Armed Conflict. The Director of the 
Delegate makes the final revision and issues the risk report. These reports 
contain three fundamental parts.330 The first part describes the population at 
risk (for example, indigenous, afro-descendent). The second part makes an 
analysis of the region. The last part lists recommendations of protective 
measures to be implemented to prevent mass human rights violations. 
Protective measures are not only of military nature, they can also include 
social, economical and political measures.   
There are three types of risk reports. The use of each is dependent 
upon the nature of the risk and the measures recommended for its 
mitigation.331 The first type, “imminent risk”, implies a high probability of 
conflict and can be issued by the DP without review from authorities. These 
reports are directly issued to the competent authorities, including the police or 
the military, for immediate action. The second report type is classed as 
“circumstantial risk”. Those reports are characterised either as “focused”, 
affecting only one municipality, or “medium scope”, affecting numerous 
                                                
328Defensoría Delegada para la Evaluación de Riesgos de la Población Civil como 
Consecuencia del Conflicto Armado. 
329 See Section 4.3.3.2. 
330 This was explained in an Interview with a National Analyst at the DP (Bogotá, Colombia, 
April 2012). 
331 ibid. 
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municipalities. The third report type, “structural risk”, identifies and evaluates 
the progression and dynamics of the armed conflict in a particular region.332 
After the issuance of the initial risk report, the SAT analysts continue to 
monitor the situation and may write follow-up reports.  
The “substantial risk” and “structural risk” reports are then verified 
and examined in an Inter-Institutional Commission for Early Warning 
(CIAT), in which the DP does not play an active role.333 The Commission is 
coordinated by the Minister of Interior and composed of the following 
ministries and government agencies: the Presidential Agency for Social 
Action and International Cooperation; the Presidential Program for Human 
Rights; the Military Forces; the Minister of Defense; the Minister of Interior; 
and the National Police. The CIAT has one week to decide, by majority vote, 
whether to emit a legally binding ‘Early-Warning.’ 
If the CIAT does issue an Early-Warning, it confirms the level of 
threat identified by the SAT. Regardless of whether the CIAT issues an Early-
Warning or not, the Committee makes recommendations to protect the 
members of the communities involved and to avoid, control or mitigate 
threats communicated in SAT risk reports. CIAT will also monitor the 
implementation of the recommended actions.334   
SAT risk reports have been used at the international level to criticise 
the failure of the government to take protective measures. Specifically, Philip 
Watson, UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary 
Executions wrote in a 2009 report on Colombia that “the Government’s 
failure to act after notice from one of its own agencies is a stark dereliction of 
its responsibilities.”335 
 
4.3.3.4 Mechanisms to fight impunity  
 
The DP’s mechanisms that contribute to fighting impunity also 
contribute to the prevention of MA crimes. Not only do sanctions act as 
dissuasive prevention by demonstrating the efficiency of the justice system, 
but arresting and prosecuting a perpetrator also prevents them from 
reoffending. The DP has systems in place to guide citizens with human rights 
issues through the process of formulating a complaint. It can also contribute 
to fighting impunity by conducting an investigation, initiating legal actions 
and cooperating with international mechanisms.  
 
4.3.3.4.1 Assistance with complaints 
 
                                                
332Terminology translation taken from USAID (n 325). 
333 The SAT President is a mere invited observer. 
334 CIAT’s review process is detailed in a Ministry of Interior and of Justice document: 
Procedimiento Evaluación Informes de Riesgo y/ o Notas de Seguimiento – CIAT, Código: 
AN-GT-P-02, Version: 01 (11 November 2010). 
335 Alston (n276) para 83. 
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The program consuming most of the DP’s budget336 is the system of 
Public Defenders that provides free legal services to indigent citizens in 
judicial processes.337 This includes indigents as defendants in criminal cases, 
victims of human rights violations, and more controversially, former 
paramilitaries accused of human rights violations.338 
The DP also provides certain legal and psychological assistance to 
victims of particular violations. Specifically, the Victims’ Law assigns 
membership of the Sistema National de Atención y Reparación Integral a las 
Víctimas (the system carrying out the implementation of the law) to the DP. 
As a result, since January 2012 the DP has been responsible for guiding, 
counselling and representing victims.339  
 
4.3.3.4.2 Investigation 
 
The DP can conduct investigations and make recommendations to the 
government on different human rights issues and situations,340 including MA 
situations. The authorities must help and provide the necessary 
information.341 During its visits, the DP has full access to information and 
may summon any person to give a testimony.342 
 
4.3.3.4.3 Initiating legal actions 
 
On its own initiative or upon petition of any person, the DP can file an 
action at the Constitutional Court to challenge or defend human rights 
regulations.343 It can also file a public action in defence of the Constitution, 
the law, general interest, or individuals before any jurisdiction, public servant 
or authority.344 The DP can moreover file a petition for protection, habeas 
corpus, unconstitutionality and class action.345  
For example, following the 2002 Choco massacre, where 119 civilians 
that had taken refuge in a Church were killed, the DP filed a lawsuit against 
the State for failure to protect its citizens. The Court ordered the government 
to pay $800,000 in compensation to the families of the victims.  
The ‘Indevelop’ report of the Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency (Sida) found the Constitutional Court to be the DP’s 
                                                
336 About 75% according to: USAID (n 325) 23. 
337 Law 24 (n 306) article 21 states that the DP shall provide public defence for persons 
without resources. 
338 USAID (n 325) 23. The report also states that “[a] number of interviewees proposed 
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339 Victim’s Law (n 273). 
340 Law 24 (n 306) article 9(22). 
341 ibid articles 15-16. 
342 ibid article 28. 
343 ibid article 9(9). 
344 Constitution (n 305) article 282(5); Law 24 (n 306) article 9(9). 
345 Law 24 (n 306) article 24. 
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“closest strategic ally, by issuing decisions systematically in favour of human 
rights protection where different state bodies (executive and judicial) fail to 
do their constitutional duty.”346  
 
4.3.3.4.4 Cooperation with international organizations and 
mechanisms  
 
Since its creation in 1992, the DP has used its capacity to participate 
in meetings, roundtables and collaborations with international organizations. 
The DP is normally invited to events organized by international organizations 
to discuss topics related to the human rights situations in Colombia. This kind 
of collaboration serves to share information and thus strengthen the capacity 
of all organizations involved.  
The DP has also developed relationships with numerous UN agencies 
to coordinate response activities following massive human rights violations. 
For example, following the 2002 massacre in Choco,347 the DP and the 
OHCHR issued reports presenting the facts and asserting the State’s failure to 
protect, prevent and guarantee as obligated by IHL.348  
The Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC349 monitors local 
investigations into the “most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole,” including genocide, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes.350 
 
4.3.3.5 Promoting an effective legal framework and 
monitoring legislation and court orders  
 
Within its function to promote an effective legal framework,351 the DP 
can contribute to preventing further MAs. For example, since laws that 
effectively protect witnesses decrease the chance of retaliation, they may 
make witnesses more comfortable with denouncing criminals. The promotion 
of such laws supports jailing criminals to prevent them from re-offending.352  
The DP can monitor legislation to see if they are working as intended. 
In the case where legislation is not effective, it can denounce the issues and 
make recommendations for the achievement of better results. 
                                                
346 Sida’s Indevelop Report (n 28) 6. 
347 See Section 4.3.3.3.2. 
348 Defensoría del Pueblo, ‘Humanitarian Resolution No. 012’ (25 May 2002). 
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Furthermore, the DP can monitor the State’s compliance with orders 
of judicial bodies, such as the Constitutional Court, on issues contributing to 
the prevention of MAs.  
 
4.3.3.6 Educative activities 
 
DP functions relating to educative activities include the dissemination 
of information on human rights and the recommendation of policies for 
teaching them,353 as well as disseminating knowledge about the Constitution, 
especially on the social, economical, cultural, collective and environmental 
rights.354 In that regard, the DP conducts educative activities on human rights 
and IHL directed topics to public officials and the population at large. 
Training of public officials can contribute to the prevention of MAs, most 
notably when military forces are trained on IHL. Activities aimed at the 
general public promote awareness, which is an important part of structural 
atrocity prevention. Since the population cannot exercise their rights fully if 
they are not aware of them, such activities have been an important instrument 
to strengthen rights consciousness and develop advocacy for effective 
protection within victimized communities.355  
The DP has various educative programs including some that are 
broadcasted on radio and on television. An innovative program is the annual 
moot court competition in which more than 70 law schools have participated. 
The competition focuses on human rights topics and serves to stimulate the 
interest of students and deepen their knowledge on human rights.356 
 
4.3.3.7 Dispute resolution mechanisms 
 
The DP can act as a mediator for the collective petitions, put forth by 
civil organizations, that are directed at the government.357 Regional DP 
offices regularly mediate between communities and the local government or 
armed forces.358  
 
4.3.4 Institutional challenges of the DP in the 
prevention of MA 
 
Despite all the tools in place that contribute to the prevention of MAs, 
the occurrence of MA situations in Colombia persists. This points to the 
                                                
353 Constitution (n 305) article 282(2). 
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challenges that remain in generating institutional preventive action. Sida 
reported that in spite of society’s high confidence in the DP, there is low 
confidence in their ability to influence other institutions to effectively protect 
communities.359  
Since the DP does not have direct coercive powers, it relies heavily on 
the actions of other institutions to follow up on its recommendations and 
ultimately give force to its work. It is therefore crucial to look beyond its 
programmes and activities and analyze the institutional entanglement 
surrounding its operations in order to determine if its work contributes to 
actual prevention of MAs.  
This section will assess the institutional weaknesses of the DP in the 
prevention of MAs. The analysis heavily relies on the insights obtained in 
semi-structured individual interviews conducted in the field study.   
 
4.3.4.1 Early-warning system 
 
4.3.4.1.1 State linkages 
 
A major weakness of the SAT’s work in the prevention of MAs 
relates to its connection with the CIAT. As described in section 4.3.3.2, the 
decision to issue a legally binding Early-Warning following the verification 
and examination of a SAT risk report is at the CIAT’s discretion. A common 
concern of human rights organizations and international institutions with the 
system in place is that the risk reports detailing preventative measures against 
mass human rights violations are often not acted upon.360 Indeed, in many 
cases, the CIAT disagrees with the SAT on the existence or severity of threats 
and decides not to issue an Early-Warning. Respondents explained that this 
situation was worse under Uribe’s presidency as government ministries 
refused to accept evidence of armed conflict in order to be consistent with the 
State’s position that there was no internal armed conflict in Colombia.361 
Philip Watson, UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or 
Arbitrary Executions wrote in his 2009 report on Colombia that he “was told 
by some Government officials that political pressure may be a factor in the 
decision of CIAT not to issue an early-warning. Military and civilian officials 
may be concerned that a warning signals security failures and deters 
investments and development and press for a warning not to be issued or to 
be prematurely withdrawn.”362 The Sida’s Indevelop Program Manager 
similarly explained that members of CIAT, such as the Military, might be 
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reluctant to validate risk reports because they may feel that their work is 
being criticised.363  
The Comision Colombiana de Juristas argues that the CIAT as it is 
currently functioning invalidates the independence of the SAT in the 
formulation of preventive measures.364 Respondents also expressed this view 
in interviews.365  
Sida’s Indevelop Program Manager suggested that a closer dialogue 
between the DP and the ministries and actors in the regions could help change 
this. She asserted the example that a better understanding of the work of the 
DP could help the ministries change their perception of the risk reports and 
realise that they do not aim to criticise their work. They could understand that 
the purpose of risk reports is rather to state facts that need to be considered in 
order to take appropriate protective measures. Human Rights Watch 
suggested reforming the CIAT to improve its performance by allowing for 
active participation by the representatives of the DP.366 Instead of being a 
mere observer at CIAT, the SAT could be awarded a voting right to influence 
the decisions on actions to be taken following risk reports.367 This would 
“ensure publicity of risk reports and transparency of the Committee’s 
decision-making, and to ensure appropriate and timely responses to risk 
reports.”368  
According to Human Rights Watch, SAT has also suffered due to 
government delays in providing necessary funding.369 
 
4.3.4.1.2 Local authorities 
 
Sida’s Indevelop Program Manager maintained in an interview that an 
even bigger issue relates to the implementation of the protective measures at 
the local level.370 Sida reports that “the military and police forces are even 
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more hesitant to implement these decisions through effective protection 
measures on the ground.”371 The report explains this problem with the fact 
that “action by the police and the military in the most affected and conflictive 
remote parts of the country are subject to local power structures dominated by 
illegal economic and armed groups which are precisely the sources of serious 
human rights violations.”372 It has been suggested by Sida’s Indevelop 
Program Manager that local implementation could be improved; with a DP 
team collaborating with local authorities to construct a plan for the 
operalization of the SAT and CIAT recommendations, which are adapted to 
the specific context, and to follow up the local implementation of these 
recommendations. She suggested that the same recommendation could be 
implemented with different measures, depending on the specific regional 
contexts.373 
 
4.3.4.1.3 Report publication 
 
The fact that the DP does not publish all of SAT’s risk reports also 
limits the role it can play in the prevention of MAs. In 2011, only 74% of the 
reports were published.374 USAID asserts that the information found in the 
SAT risk reports “may provide the best factual and current illustration of the 
type of human rights challenges that Colombia faces.”375 Access to such 
information contributes to raising awareness. It follows that limiting the 
publication of risk reports also limits the level of public awareness that the 
DP could raise.  
 
 
4.3.4.2 Moral Office 
 
As explained in section 4.3.3.1 on the Moral Office, the Defensor has 
more of a moral, than a coercive authority. The role of the institution is rather 
centralized in the functions of the Defensor as described in Article 282 of the 
Constitution.376 It follows that the strength and effectiveness of the DP relies 
heavily on how actively the Defensor carries out its functions by making 
pronouncements and applying its powers of moral persuasion in the defense 
of human rights.377 
As described in section 4.3.1 on the institutional set-up, there is a 
political aspect in the election of the Defensor. The President of Colombia 
chooses the candidates from which the House of Representatives elects a 
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Defensor. This could allow a President to decide on the level of Moral Office 
that will be exercised by the DP. For example, if a President shortlists only 
candidates known to be discrete rather than express its concern in the face of 
human rights violations, it would guarantee that the Moral Office will not be 
exercised to its full potential. This could be useful for a President wanting to 
prevent the denouncement of certain government actions or inactions.  
The present Defensor keeps a discrete and low profile and rarely 
makes use of the media in the execution of his duties.378 Sida maintains that 
this may “legitimize the widespread inaction by those who make the 
difference between human rights violations and protection.”379 Although 
documents produced by the DP contain crucial information about the 
humanitarian crisis and at-risk situations, it has a lesser impact in raising 
public awareness as it does not reach the population at large.  
 
4.3.4.3 Protection of groups and individuals at risk 
 
Certain groups and individuals remain at higher risk of being victims 
of MAs. This is especially the case for women and victims of displacement.   
  
4.3.4.3.1 Women 
 
An appropriate gender strategy in the work of the DP is lacking.380 
Although there is a DP Delegate for Women, Children and Youth, few 
resources are specifically directed towards women.381 As previously stated, 
women are more vulnerable to certain MA crimes such as sexual violence and 
internal displacement. The lack of a sensible gender strategy impedes the 
effective prevention of these types MAs.  
 
4.3.4.3.2 Victims of displacement 
 
As mentioned in section 4.1.3.2, forced displacement makes civilians 
particularly vulnerable to MA situations. The Victims' Law, which provides 
for the restitution of lands, was thus seen to provide an enhanced opportunity 
for better human rights protection. The recent events show that this has not 
exactly been the case thus far. In response to the government's land restitution 
efforts, there has been a rise in killings, threats and attacks against leaders of 
displaced communities campaigning for land recovery.382 
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Staff members of the DP Specialized Office for Comprehensive 
Attention to Victims suggested in an interview that the Defensor could use its 
Moral Office to promote an effective governmental policy regarding the 
protection of leaders of displaced persons who are claiming back their 
lands.383  
 
 
4.3.4.4 Institutional capacity 
 
The DP’s strained financial resources limit its capacity to reach its full 
potential of human rights protection and MA prevention. Most notably, 
numerous respondents asserted that the DP could have a greater preventive 
impact if it had more resources allocated to increasing its presence in the 
regions and hiring more Regional Analysts.384  
The USAID report points out a number of other institutional 
limitations. It notes that the temporary employment of DP training staff may 
have weakened the development of teaching material and questions the 
degree of effective integration of the training component in the institutional 
structure of the DP.385 USAID also highlights that the DP has a limited 
capacity to review the policies and legislations “on which they should be 
leading moral authority.”386 With regards to SAT, it maintains that the system 
in place lacks the capacity necessary to monitor the government’s compliance 
with the risk reports and early-warnings due to the lack of resources. In 
addition, USAID points out that the persons interviewed “most commonly 
identified expanding the capacity of the SAT, including the mobility of its 
analysts, as key factors that would facilitate its effectiveness.”387 In a 2010 
report, HRW similarly urges the Colombian government to expand SAT.388 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
383 Interview with the Staff members of the DP Specialized Office on Comprehensive 
Attention to Victims, (Bogotá, Colombia, April 2012). 
384 Interview with SAT National Analyst at the DP (Bogotá, Colombia, April 2012); 
Interview with the Manager of Sida Indevelop Program at the Embassy of Sweden in 
Colombia (Bogotá, Colombia, April 2012); Interview with former Regional Analyst (Bogotá, 
Colombia, April 2012). 
385 Sida’s Indevelop Report (n 28) 6.  
386  ibid. 
387 USAID (n 258) 48. 
388 Human Rights Watch, ‘Paramilitaries’ Heirs – The New face of Violence in Colombia’ (n 
360) 15. 
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5. Conclusion 
5.1 Summary of the findings 
 
5.1.1 Scope of States primary prevention obligations 
under R2P 
 
The analysis reveals de lege lata that current IL only requires States to 
prevent genocide and war crimes, and not crimes against humanity. With 
regards to genocide, all States must “employ all measures reasonably 
available to them so as to prevent genocide as far as possible.”389 This is an 
obligation to prevent genocide with ‘due diligence’. As per the prevention of 
war crimes, Common Article 1 of the Geneva Convention similarly obliges 
States to do everything they can to ensure that all under their jurisdiction 
respect IHL.390 Further IHL provisions place specific obligations, relating to 
the prevention of war crimes, upon States. This notably includes the 
obligation to incorporate IHL in the domestic legal system, to disseminate 
IHL and to investigate, prosecute and punish IHL violations.391 
The thesis argues de lege ferenda that to the extent that crimes against 
humanity rise to the level of jus cogens and thus carry erga omnes 
obligations, States could have a positive obligation to act to prevent their 
commission.392 The same IHRL-based methodological principles applied by 
the ICJ in assessing the obligation of States to prevent genocide could in 
theory apply to other MAs that also carry erga omnes obligations.393 It is 
moreover argued that if R2P could expand on the pre-existing legal 
obligations of States,394 it would have resulted in the inclusion of an 
obligation to prevent crimes against humanity. 
 
5.1.2 Role of NHRIs in the implementation of States 
primary responsibility to prevent 
 
The thesis displays that even if NHRIs do not directly implement the 
obligations of States, they play an important practical role in monitoring the 
                                                
389 Bosnia v Serbia (n 99) para 430. 
390 Common Article 1 to the four Geneva Conventions (n 98); Pictet (n 124) 24-27; Boisson 
de Charzounes and Condorelli (n 122). 
391 See section 2.3.2.5. 
392 In Bosnia v. Serbia (n 99) the ICJ left this question open. See section 2.3.2.3.  
393 Strauss (n 49) 317; Glanville (n 117) 26. 
394 As put forward by Chhabra and Zucker (n 88) 57.    
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government’s implementation of IL, in particular human rights obligations. 
Although NHRIs generally do not have a coercive force, they have various 
mechanisms available, to help them ensure compliance with their 
recommendations.   
The thesis also addresses the operational framework that R2P adds to 
the pre-existing legal obligations of States to prevent MAs. The acts of 
implementation comprise of structural and direct measures aimed at 
preventing both armed conflicts and MAs. Moreover, the preventive tools 
should be applied throughout all stages of a MA crisis, not only to prevent the 
initial outbreak but also to prevent its continuance, escalation and recurrence. 
This work shows that a State’s contribution to the cessation of MAs through 
both structural and direct preventive measures is pertinent to their primary 
responsibility to protect their populations.  
The research reveals that NHRIs are well suited to contribute to the 
practical implementation of States’ obligations to prevent the occurrence, 
escalation and recurrence of MAs by promoting and protecting human rights 
and using their mandate to take appropriate structural and direct preventive 
measures. Most notably, the study shows that given their investigative nature 
and in some cases, quasi-judicial powers, they are in a privileged position to 
collect and analyze information in its local context. NHRIs can then transmit 
the relevant information to the authorities capable of taking the appropriate 
preventive measures.  
The thesis also displays that NHRIs can contribute to preventing MAs 
in other more indirect ways. Although the preventive means and tools 
available to each NHRI will depend on its particular mandate, the study 
reveals that NHRIs can generally contribute to the practical implementation 
of R2P by carrying out a number of its regular programmes and activities. 
Through these actions, NHRIs can contribute to preventing MAs by 
promoting a legal framework that effectively prevents MAs and working on 
the implementation of the legal framework, for instance by providing training 
to public officials on IL. NHRIs can also contribute to preventing MAs 
through their control mechanisms, this includes cooperating with international 
mechanisms, monitoring situations at-risk, promoting public awareness and 
where applicable, making use of their quasi-jurisdictional function. 
 
5.1.3 Means and tools of the Defensoría del Pueblo in 
the implementation of R2P  
 
With specific regards to the Colombian DP, the study reveals that the 
institution uses its mandate to prevent the main MAs occurring in Colombia. 
It does so with a range of mechanisms and programmes. The DP most notably 
helps to address: killings and attacks against civilians; forced displacement; 
child soldier recruitment; sexual violence; enforced disappearances and 
kidnappings; anti-personnel land mines incidents; and torture. The DP is 
enabled to effectively participate in the prevention of such conflict-related 
violence by being fully compliant with the Paris Principles and having the 
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exceptional functions to promote and defend both human rights and 
humanitarian law. The institution contributes to the prevention of MAs with a 
wide range of tools. First, through its Moral Office, that is the use of the 
Denfensor’s voice and authority, the DP can denounce the state of certain 
human rights-related situations. Second, with its Community Defenders 
program, the DP is able to protect the rights of populations at-risk or whose 
human rights have been violated by the conflict. It does so by, for instance, 
advising civil society organizations working with displaced persons and the 
local government. Third, with its sophisticated early-warning system, SAT, 
the DP can monitor and flag imminent risks of violations of human rights 
against civilian populations and issue risk reports to the authorities capable of 
taking appropriate preventive action. Fourth, the DP contributes to preventing 
MAs through its mechanisms to fight impunity. The DP carries this out by 
providing assistance with complaints, including free legal services to indigent 
citizens and judicial processes, as well as legal and psychological assistance 
to victims of particular violations in the context of the implementation of the 
Victim’s Law. The DP can also initiate legal actions, such as filing an action 
at the Constitutional Court to challenge the constitutionality of a certain law 
or filing a public action. Moreover, the DP can cooperate with international 
organizations and mechanisms to share information and thus, strengthen its 
capacity. Finally, the DP can contribute to prevent MAs by promoting an 
effective legal framework, monitoring legislation and court orders, providing 
training activities, and applying dispute resolution mechanisms.  
Despite the prevention work of the DP in many areas, the occurrence 
of MAs persists. This points to the practical challenges that remain in 
generating institutional preventive action. The study reveals that the 
weaknesses of the DP in the prevention of MAs relate mainly to four areas of 
concern. First, a major weakness is in relation to the work of the SAT: the 
SAT risk reports are often not acted upon by the CIAT; the protective 
measures that are ordered are often not implemented at the local level; and the 
DP does not publish all of its SAT risk reports. Second, the study reveals that 
the Defensor is not using its Moral Office as it should for the optimal 
prevention of MA. Instead of using the media to make pronouncements and 
apply its powers of moral persuasion in the defense of human rights, the 
current Defensor prefers to execute his task in a more discrete way. This 
negatively affects the strength and effectiveness of the DP as a whole, and 
clearly has an impact on the capacity of the institution to prevent MAs. Third, 
the analysis revealed that there is a lack of effective protection for women and 
victims of forced displacement, who are at higher risk of being victims of 
MAs. Fourth, the study shows that the institutional capacity of the DP is 
limited by funding. This directly affects the availability of human resources 
and infrastructures, and restrains its ability to reach its full potential of human 
rights protection and MA prevention, specifically in the regions.  
Recommendations to remedy those challenges are presented under 
section 5.3. 
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5.2 Analysis 
MAs are preventable, and this thesis has shown that NHRIs around the 
globe can contribute to their prevention. While R2P is regarded with 
suspicion by some governments fearing infringements of their sovereignty 
and NHRIs are well placed to contribute to the implementation of the first 
pillar of the principle, as they are seen to pose a lesser threat to the power and 
integrity of the State.395 While NHRIs do not have a coercive force, when 
properly institutionalized they can play an important role in helping their 
governments meet their IL obligations.  
There are strong arguments for NHRIs to undertake the prevention of 
MAs as part of their work. The most serious human rights violations, such as 
violations of the right to life and the right to physical and mental integrity, 
frequently involve MA crimes. Amnesty International suggested that NHRIs 
should prioritize their work, according to the seriousness of the violations 
alleged.396 As such, many countries “will need to prioritize work on such 
violations, in order to be effective and credible in their work to protect and 
promote human rights.”397 
The author argues that all NHRIs support the implementation of R2P 
through their programmes and activities, which promote a culture of human 
rights, and therefore prevent structural MA causes. Moreover, with their 
conciliatory nature, NHRIs are in an ideal position to monitor the 
implementation of ESC rights violations, which are precursors of MA 
situations.  
The thesis shows that NHRIs can also use their other functions to 
contribute more directly to prevention. Its monitoring function appears to be 
of most relevance, as it is through this that NHRIs can collect information, 
analyze it in its local context and transmit it to those capable of acting along 
with recommendations. In that field, lessons can be learned from the DP, 
which has been working in the midst of MA situations since its creation in 
1992. The DP has developed effective tools that are capable of halting MA 
crimes; both structurally through its general programmes and activities as 
well as more directly by flagging imminent risks. The case study on the DP 
has revealed that by monitoring events and the situation of vulnerable groups 
and individuals, NHRIs are in a privileged position to halt MAs. Most 
notably, early-warning mechanisms allow for MA prevention throughout all 
stages of a crisis: not only before the initial outbreak, but also during and 
post-conflict to prevent its continuance, escalation and recurrence. Depending 
on their mandate, other NHRIs could also create their own early-warning 
mechanism, even if early warning is not explicitly listed in their functions. 
For example, certain NHRIs that have the mandate to develop strategies for 
the promotion and protection of human rights could use this function to 
justify the creation of an early-warning system. Other NHRIs looking to 
                                                
395 Zambara (n 157) 459. 
396 Amnesty International, ‘NHRIs recommendations’ (n 154) 11. 
397 ibid 4.  
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establish an early-warning mechanism could take inspiration from 
Colombia’s SAT model. 
The case study of the Colombian DP reveals that one of the primary 
shortcomings in effective MA prevention is that the institutional links of the 
DP are in many cases obstructing its work from having a practical effect. 
First, the Head of the DP, which has been elected through a process lacking 
independence safeguards, often refrains from publicly denouncing flagrant 
human rights violations. This highlights the importance of NHRIs in fulfilling 
the general benchmarks of the Paris Principles, particularly the requirement of 
independence, in order to optimize their effectiveness in the prevention of 
MAs. This lack of independence in the election of the Head of an NHRI can 
negatively affect its effectiveness. This can be detrimental to the human rights 
situation. As Amnesty International has put it: “[a]n ineffective NHRI which 
does not address human rights violations actively can be an instrument for 
impunity, rather than a tool to promote and protect human rights.”398 Further, 
failure to criticize the work of government, when necessary, may make 
NHRIs lose their credibility.399 Second, the authorities capable of enforcing 
the recommendations of the DP are often ignoring them. It is argued here that 
there are two prospective ways to ensure that NHRI recommendations are 
followed up: 1) NHRIs should be able to refer their findings and 
recommendations to a judicial body;400 and 2) the implementation of a 
suitable framework that compels the relevant authorities to respond within a 
specified time to findings and recommendations of their NHRIs.401 The issue 
remains that it is up to the government to set up these frameworks and 
undertake these obligations. Governments should consider undertaking such 
obligations to help them meet their international obligations, including those 
regarding MA prevention. In the case where their recommendations are 
ignored however, NHRIs should use every tool available to them to generate 
pressure on the government and raise the political cost of non-compliance.  
The author argues that NHRIs could play a greater role in the 
prevention of MAs by mainstreaming and integrating R2P into their work. 
Instead of only contributing to preventing the structural causes of MAs by 
raising awareness through education and training programmes, NHRIs could 
take R2P-targeted actions. For example, NHRIs could issue factsheets and 
publicize information through the media and educational curriculums on the 
R2P principle and the responsibilities of the State towards its population. R2P 
training could be introduced into human rights training aimed at State actors. 
NHRIs could also encourage governments to develop national action plans 
that include specific R2P strategies addressing structural causes of R2P such 
as legislation for the protection of minorities and the elimination of political, 
social and economic discrimination. They could also encourage the 
government to take specific steps or implement particular strategies to 
improve the domestic implementation of R2P. Finally, in the context of their 
                                                
398 ibid 7.  
399 ibid.  
400 ibid 15-16. National Council on Human Rights Policy (n 26) 9.  
401 Amnesty International, ‘NHRIs recommendations’ (n 154) 9. 
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monitoring functions, NHRIs could request specific information on the 
actions taken by the government in the implementation of R2P.  
 
Reflecting upon the findings summarized in section 5.1 as well as the 
analysis above, recommendations to enhance the capacity of NHRIs to 
prevent MAs are put forward in section 5.3.  
 
 
5.3 Recommendations 
The following recommendations are advanced for States to improve 
the capacity of their individual NHRI to contribute to the implementation of 
R2P:  
1. States should ensure that their NHRI is independent from the 
government in its functioning. This includes removing the 
involvement of the executive from the appointment process of 
the head of the NHRI. The independence of a NHRI is directly 
related to its effectiveness in carrying out its activities. States 
should also ensure that NHRI institutional entanglements do 
not invalidate or limit their independence.  
 
2. States should ensure that their NHRI has sufficient funding to 
uphold its mandate. By promoting and protecting human 
rights, NHRIs support the prevention of the structural causes 
of MA crimes.   
 
3. States should explicitly include R2P, in particular the 
prevention of MAs, in the mandate of its NHRI. This would 
enable NHRIs to design targeted measures aimed at preventing 
MAs. In addition, the State should be responsible for issuing 
information and reports on its domestic implementation of 
R2P.  
 
4. States should include early-warning as a function of their 
NHRI. This would allow the NHRI to contribute to the 
prevention of MAs not only through structural measures, but 
also more directly by flagging imminent risks of MAs.  
 
5. States should set up a framework that allows their NHRI to 
refer its findings and recommendations to a judicial body and 
undertake the obligation to respond within a specified time to 
findings and recommendations of their NHRIs. This would 
ensure that the work of their NHRI is followed-up and would 
ultimately help States meet their international obligation in 
respect to MA prevention. 
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The following recommendations are put forward to NHRIs to improve 
their role in the prevention of MAs in accordance with their mandate to 
protect and promote human rights: 
 
1. NHRIs should explicitly include R2P in its agenda. This could 
involve: introducing R2P modules into educative programmes; 
opening a dialogue with the State on its implementation of 
R2P; and consider R2P issues in its reports and 
recommendations to authorities.   
 
2. NHRIs should, when their mandate allows, establish an early-
warning mechanism. This could be made possible even if 
early-warning is not explicitly listed in their functions. For 
example, some NHRIs that have the mandate to develop 
strategies for the promotion and protection of human rights 
could use this function to justify the creation of an early-
warning system. 
 
With specific regard to the DP in Colombia, the following 
recommendations are put forward to help overcome the institutional 
challenges that the DP is facing in the prevention of MAs. 
 
1. The government of Colombia should adopt a new appointing 
procedure for the position of Defensor to assure the political 
independence of the work of the DP. The fact that the 
President of Colombia is the one shortlisting the candidates 
negatively affects the legitimacy and thus, the efficiency of the 
DP. An appointment procedure that leaves out the executive 
branch is crucial to distance the Defensor from the government 
of the day, and thereby assure the independence of the DP.  
 
2. The Defensor should make greater use of its Moral Office to 
promote effective protective measures and other policies 
contributing to the prevention of MAs. Given the current 
context, the DP should focus on using its Moral Office to 
promote protective policies and measures for the leaders of 
displaced persons who are claiming the restitution of lands 
under the Victim’s Law.  
 
3. The DP should elaborate and implement a gender-based 
approach to its activities to pay greater attention to women’s 
issues. Specifically, the issue of sexual violence against 
women should receive the due attention it deserves. The 
gender-based approach must involve the support and training 
of victims’ associations, psychologists and lawyers. This 
would offer better protection to women, who are particularly 
vulnerable to MAs within the context of the Colombian armed 
conflict.  
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4. The government of Colombia should adopt legislation 
amending the functioning of the early-warning mechanisms. 
Most notably, the mandate of CIAT should be remodelled to 
give the SAT an active role in its decision-making process. 
The DP must also ensure that all risk reports are published. 
This would help raise public awareness on current situations 
and put pressure on the government to fulfill its preventive 
obligations in cases of MA threats. Moreover, the Colombian 
government should develop a clearer strategy for the 
implementation of risk reports and Early Warnings. The new 
strategy needs to involve the local authorities in the 
elaboration of regional plans for the implementation of the 
recommended measures, to ensure that the means taken reflect 
the specific local contexts. This must also comprise of 
monitoring mechanisms to ensure that the means chosen have 
the desired effect. The SAT should also work on having a 
more open dialogue with the members of CIAT; in order to 
improve the understanding of the latter on the nature of the 
work of the DP, and more specifically, the work of the SAT.  
 
5. The DP should mobilize greater financial support from the 
international community to improve its institutional capacity. 
The additional financial support should most notably be used 
to expand the capacities in the regions and increase the number 
of Regional Analysts.  
 
6. The government of Colombia should become a party to 
OPCAT. This could entail making the DP a NPM with a 
system of regular visits to places of detentions and could 
ultimately reinforce the DP’s capacity to contribute to the 
prevention of torture. 
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Annex 1 
Guía de Entrevista 
 
 
1. ¿Podría describir brevemente en qué consiste o consistía su trabajo en la 
Defensoría del Pueblo? 
 
2. ¿Usted trabaja o trabajó en la prevención de delitos atroces? 
Si es así, ¿Podría explicar las formas en las que estaban contribuyendo a la 
prevención? (Por ejemplo, SAT, un programa en particular, etc.) 
 
3. ¿Cuál es el mandato de la Defensoría del Pueblo en relación con la 
prevención de delitos atroces? 
 
• ¿Cómo la Defensoría del Pueblo interpreta y usa su mandato legal 
para mejorar su capacidad de prevenir delitos atroces? 
 
4. ¿Cuáles son los principales programas de la Defensoría del Pueblo que 
contribuyen a la prevención de delitos atroces? 
 
5. ¿Qué podría hacerse para mejorar la capacidad de la Defensoría del Pueblo 
para prevenir delitos atroces? 
a) Magistratura moral 
b) Defensa efectiva con las instituciones públicas encargadas de la aplicación 
de medidas de protección 
c) Participar con actores regionales, nacionales o internacionales 
d) Mecanismos alternativos de solución de controversias/ mediación en 
relación con la prevención de conflictos 
e) Otro 
 
 
6. ¿La Defensoría del Pueblo colabora con otros actores interesados en la 
prevención de delitos atroces?  
 
7. ¿En el contexto colombiano, cuáles son los principales retos en la 
prevención de delitos atroces ? (Por ejemplo, la corrupción, el informe 
selectivo, etc.) 
 
8. ¿Ve usted algunas cuestiones de neutralidad en la forma en que la 
Defensoría del Pueblo lleva a cabo su mandato en lo que respecta a la 
prevención de delitos atroces? (Por ejemplo, la financiación internacional, la 
estructura de toma de decisions, etc.) 
 
9. ¿Cuales cree usted que son las mayores amenazas reales a la capacidad y 
actuación de la Defensoría del Pueblo para la prevención de delitos atroces? 
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Interview Guide 
 
1. Could you please tell me about your job description? 
 
2. Have you been involved to some extent in the prevention of mass atrocity 
crimes? If so, could you elaborate on the ways in which you were 
contributing to the prevention? (e.g. early-warning system, a particular 
program, etc.) 
 
3. What is the mandate of the Defensoría del Pueblo in relation to the 
prevention of mass atrocities? 
 
• How does the Defensoría del Pueblo interpret its legal mandate to 
engage in activities to prevent mass atrocities? 
 
4. What are the main programs of the Defensoría del Pueblo that contribute to 
the prevention of mass atrocities? 
 
5. What more could be done to better enable the Defensoría del Pueblo to 
prevent mass atrocity crimes? 
a) Moral office 
b) Effective advocacy with public institutions responsible for the 
implementation of protective action 
c) Engage with national, regional and international actors 
d) Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in relation to conflict 
prevention and mediation 
e) Other 
 
6. Has the Defensoría del Pueblo engaged with any other national actors on 
peace and security issues?  
 
7. In the Colombian context, what are the main challenges in the prevention 
and response to mass atrocities? (e.g. corruption, selective reporting, etc.) 
 
8. Do you see any neutrality issues in the way the Defensoría del Pueblo is 
carrying out its mandate with regards to the prevention of mass atrocities? 
(e.g. foreign funding, decision-making structure, etc.) 
 
9. What do you consider to be the main threats to the effective ability of the 
Defensoría del Pueblo to prevent mass atrocity crimes? 
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Annex 2  
 Constitution of Colombia promulgated 4 July 1991. 
 
Constitution Art. 281:  
The Public Defender shall be part of the Public Ministry and will exercise the functions under 
the maximum supervision of the Prosecutor General of the Nation. He/she will be elected by 
the Chamber of Representatives for a period of four years. From within a trio prepared by the 
President of the Republic.” 
 
Constitution Art. 282:  
“The Public Defender will safeguard the promotion, exercise and public dissemination of 
human rights, for which it will exercise the following functions:  
1. Orient and instruct the residents of the national territory and Colombians abroad in 
the exercise and defence of their rights before competent authorities or entities of a 
private nature. 
2. To disseminate human rights and recommend policies for the teaching thereof.  
3. To invoke the right of habeas corpus and to instigate tutelage actions, without 
impairment of the right to aid interested parties. 
4. To organize and direct the Office of the Public Defender in the terms indicated by 
law.  
5. To instigate popular actions in matters related to its area of competence.  
6. To present legislative bills on matters related to the area of its competence.  
7. To present reports to Congress on the fulfilment of its functions and duties. 
8. Any other functions or duties determined by law. 
 
Constitution Article 283:  
The law will determine the organization and functioning of the Office of the Public Defender. 
 
 
Ley 24 de 1992 (diciembre 15), Por la cual se establecen la organización y 
funcionamiento de la Defensoría del Peublo y se dictan otras disposiciones en desarrollo 
del artículo 283 de la Constitución Política de Colombia 
 
Law Art. 9:  
In addition to the powers indicated in the Constitution, the Public Defender shall have the 
following:  
1. Design and adopt policies promoting and disseminating Human Rights in the 
Country with the Prosecutor General of the nations, in order to demand and defend 
them. 
2. Direct and coordinate the work of the various divisions making up the Office of 
Public Defence.  
3. Make recommendations and observations to authorities and private parties in the case 
of a threat against or violation of Human Rights and to oversee the promotion and 
exercise thereof. The Defender may make such recommendations public and report to 
Congress on the response received. 
4. Perform diagnoses of general nature on the economic, social, cultural, legal and 
political situations in which individuals may find themselves with respect to the 
State.  
5. Pressure private organizations so that they abstain from neglecting a right. 
6. Disseminate knowledge of the Political Constitution of Colombia, especially the 
fundamental social, economic, cultural, collective and environmental rights. 
7. Present an annual report to Congress on its activities in which will be included a 
listing of the type and number of complaints received, the measures taken to deal 
with it and results, express mention of officials refusing to cooperate or of individuals 
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implicated and the recommendations of an administrative and legal nature considered 
necessary. 
8. Assist the Prosecutor General in the drafting of reports on the situation of Human 
Rights in the country.  
9. Demand, refute or defend any rule related to Human Rights by own initiative or at 
the request of any person when indicated. Instate public action in defence od the 
National Constitution, law, general welfare or of individuals before any jurisdiction, 
public servant or authority.  
10. Design the mechanisms needed to establish permanent communication and share 
information with governmental and non-governmental organizations on a national 
and international basis for the protection and defence of Human Rights. 
11. Enter into agreements with national and international educational and research 
institutions for the dissemination and promotion of Human Rights. 
12. Enter into contracts and issue administrative acts as required for the functioning of 
the Office, as well as to perform the legal and judicial representation of the 
institution, using the powers or mandates granted to it for this purpose as necessary.  
13. Appoint Delegate Defenders by subject area for the study and defence of particular 
rights.  
14. Exercise expenditure inherent to the Office as such, subject to the measures 
established in the Organic Law of the General Budget of the National and regulatory 
standards with respect to appropriations, additions, transfers, additions, transfers, 
expenditure agreements, programme for cash, payments and formation of payment 
reserves.  
15. Present the Budget Proposal for the Office of Public Defence to the consideration of 
the National Government.  
16. Administer the goods and resources allocated to the operation of the Office of Public 
Defence and assume responsibility for its correct assignment and use.  
17. Appoint and remove employees from the Office, as well as define their 
administrative status. 
18. Establish regulations needed for the efficient and effective functioning of the Office 
of Public Defence, all of that related to its organization and internal functions and the 
regulation of administrative processes not provided by law.  
19. Be mediator for the collective petitions put forth by civic or popular organizations 
directed at public administration when the require it.  
20. Oversee the rights of ethnic minorities and consumers. 
21. Participate in the monthly meetings held by the Commission on Human Rights and 
Congressional Hearings, and at the holding of Special Hearings in order to establish 
joint policies in a coordinated fashion in defence of Human Rights according to the 
provisions of articles 56 and 57 of the Regulation of Congress (Law OS of June 17, 
1992). 
22. Present periodic reports to public opinion on the results of investigations, publicly 
denouncing the failure to acknowledge Human Rights.  
23. To serve as mediator between users and public or private companies that render 
public services when they so request in the defence of their presumably violated 
rights. 
24. Any other indicated in other legal measures. 
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